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PREFACE 
What are the free speech rights of a publicly employed professor? 
That is the question for my study, although I knew before I started that no 
precise answer would be found. The laws concerning professorial speech 
are, at best, fluid and, consequently, this study represents only a snapshot 
of a constantly evolving legal issue. I hope, however, the research is 
useful in calling attention to what I believe is a significant and growing 
problem for everyone in higher education. 
It also should be noted that no faculty member or administrator 
should use this study as a substitute for legal counsel. If anything was 
learned from the study, it was that free speech analysis is a difficult chore 
at best and each case has a unique set of facts and circumstances. In 
addition, issues will be viewed differently by the courts in the various 
jurisdictions. Therefore, educators contemplating litigation should seek 
specific legal advice from either university counsel or a competent 
attorney in their area. 
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CHAPTER I 
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech," reads 
the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court also has repeatedly 
ruled that a publicly employed professor cannot be dismissed or disciplined 
for exercising constitutionally protected speech and that the First 
Amendment does not tolerate laws that cast a ''pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom." 
A quick glance at the literature, however, shows neither the law nor 
the professorial speech issue is as black-and-white as the above language 
indicates. For example, the University of New Hampshire suspended 
Donald Silva for "sexually harassing" comments he made to his technical 
writing class. Leonard Jeffries' term as department.chair at the City College of 
New York was reduced after he made anti-Semitic comments at an off-
campus speech. The University of Indiana denied Sociology professors 
Kenneth Colburn and Robert Khoury tenure after they became embroiled in 
disputes with their colleagues. 
Relevant to this study is the fact that the cases of Silva, Jeffries and 
Colburn took place in different settings: Silva's comments came in his role as 
a teacher. Jeffries' statements arguably came in his role as a citizen in an off-
campus speech. Colburn and Khoury's letter took place amid a political battle 
in their department. For each case, however, courts applied a different First 
Amendment standard. Consequently, not only does the law fail to shield all 
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professorial speech - it also safeguards certain kinds of speech more 
vigorously than others. 
Statement of the Problem 
H all professorial speech is not safeguarded by the First Amendment, 
what speech is constitutionally protected? Stated another way, what First 
Amendment freedom of speech rights does a professor have in the 
classroom? Outside the classroom? In disputes that can be described as 
bickering by academicians? Under what circumstances may an administrator 
legally discipline a faculty member for something he or she says? 
No black-and-white answers exist for these questions. Kaplin (1995) 
says it is unclear what professorial speech is constitutionally protected, noting 
that it depends on the specific facts of the case, the particular court's view on 
the First Amendment and the courts' sensitivities to academic freedom.1 
Ryan (1988) writes that "the lesson for the educator is simple and short: Until 
the system changes, there is simply no way to tell whether certain speech will 
be protected by the Constitution" (p. 716). 
One primary obstacle in defining legal boundaries of professorial 
speech is the law itself. Analyzing any free speech issue has become a 
pervasive and complicated regulatory scheme. (Nagle, 1984). Courts, 
therefore, are generally inconsistent in deciding free speech disputes of all 
kinds, including those involving professors. 
1 Kaplin makes this statement in regards to out-of-class speech, but his swrumuy illustrates that no lucid lines 
have been drawn by courts in the other arenas as well. 
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A second quandary is the decision-making process of the federal courts. 
A difficulty in professorial speech cases, which is discussed more in-depth in 
this study, is the absence of a clear United States Supreme Court precedent on 
the question. Without clear guidance from the nation's highest court, lower 
courts have, in effect, adopted a piecemeal approach to deciding faculty free 
speech disputes. 
The courts' lack of consistency and clarity presents a problem for both 
administrators and faculty members alike in higher education. On one hand, 
administrators are unsure when they can censure, discipline or dismiss a 
faculty member for fear of a First Amendment claim. Professors, on the other 
hand, may be hesitant to express their thoughts or opinion for fear of 
retribution. 
Definition of Terms 
Professor is defined as any faculty member, tenured or non-tenured, 
who works at a public institution of higher education. This includes any 
faculty member, including those employed part-time, regardless of rank. 
Teacher· is defined as a teacher in lower education. 
Administrator is defined as any official employed at a public 
institution of higher education in an administrative capacity. Typically, this 
person is employed as a Department Chair or a Dean, although the term also 
is used to identify vice-presidents, presidents and regents. It should be noted 
that administrators, who typically also are professors, may become embroiled 
in a free speech dispute with their supervisors. 
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Court decisions are defined as all federal court decisions that are 
published in a recognized reporter or that appear on Westlaw. A First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech lawsuit is defined as any published federal 
case that includes a free speech claim as a part of the cause of action. A win by 
the professor is defined as prevailing on a First Amendment free speech 
claim, not necessarily the entire lawsuit.· A win by a university is defined as 
prevailing on a First Amendment free speech claim, not necessarily the entire 
lawsuit. Precedent is defined as an adjudged case or decision of the United 
States Supreme Court, considered as furnishing an example or authority for 
an identical or similar case afterward arising on a similar question of law 
(Black, 1990). 
Speech is defined as either verbal or written expression. Symbolic 
expression, for the purposes of this study, is not included. In-class speech is 
defined as speech uttered by a professor (acting in her role as teacher) inside a 
university classroom. Out-of-class speech is defined as speech expressed 
outside the classroom. Academic Bickering is defined as speech concerning 
an individual grievance. It does not imply the bickering is related to a matter 
of academic importance -- only that the "bickering'' takes place in the 
academic setting. 
Limitations of Study 
The proposed study is delimited in scope, method and data by the 
following factors. First, while many studies have focused on the broader 
concept of a professor's academic freedom, this study examines only the free 
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speech rights a professor has under the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Academic freedom will be examined only to the extent it 
relates to a court's interpretation of the professor's free speech rights. 
Second, the free speech rights of teachers in elementary and secondary 
schools will not be analyzed, although some of the literature may be 
discussed. In addition, this study does not deal with professorial speech at 
private universities. 
Third, the study used only data from published federal court decisions 
from 1968 until 1996. Neither unpublished federal decisions nor published 
state court decisions are analyzed in this study. Much of the reasoning behind 
this decision is that a professor's claim of retaliatory discharge, denial of 
tenure, or a failure to have a contract renewed for engaging in an activity 
protected by the First Amendment is generally brought in a federal court 
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.2 
Fourth, the study is limited to published federal court decisions from 
1968 until January of 1996. The time frame was chosen because the first 
significant free speech case in the United States Supreme Court took place in 
1968. January of 1996 was the last case examined for this study. 
Fifth, the study looked at only First Amendment free speech claims, 
not the entire lawsuit. For the purposes of this review, a professor need only 
2 The anatomy of a "free speech' case in federal court is typically as follows. The professor is denied tenure, 
disciplined (e.g., does not receive a raise, demoted, etc.) or her contract is not renewed and then claims the 
university action took place because of something she said or wrote. The case is then filed in federal court where 
the university traditionally argues the personnel decision had nothing to do with the professor's speech. Often 
times, the university will say its officials should receive "qualified immunity" or make a summary judgment 
5 
prevail on the free speech claim and not the entire lawsuit. The same holds 
true for the university. In effect, the free speech claim was dissected from the 
rest of the lawsuit for examination. 
Finally, the study is not an all-encompassing look at faculty free speech. 
It should be viewed as a look at only a "slice" of the professorial speech pie. It 
focuses solely on what transpired in the published federal court decisions and, 
as a result, does not purport to examine issues, disputes and circumstances 
which never make it to a federal court house. In particular, it offers no 
specific assumptions as to the protection afforded faculty members under 
contract law and AAUP language in faculty handbooks. Furthermore, the 
numbers (i.e., who won or loss the lawsuit) were not statistically analyzed and 
are used only to illustrate findings in the study. 
Methodology 
The methodology used in the study is legal analysis. Ninety-nine cases 
were identified that involved a professor's claim of a First Amendment free 
speech violation. The decisions were then examined, briefed and coded. An 
analysis of the cases then took place to determine how courts collectively 
dealt with the professorial speech question. 
At this point, the personal bias of the researcher needs to be discussed. 
Observation by individual researchers are sometimes biased toward finding 
precedent for their own point of view (Ulmer, 1963). In this study, I 
acknowledge an absolutist First Amendment viewpoint. However, along the 
motion. The court then renders a decision. If summary ~gment is denied, the case proceeds to trial. 
same lines, I believe it is imperative that professors realize they should use 
their position only to espouse speech pertinent to their roles and 
responsiblities. As a result of these conflicting viewpoints, I have made an 
effort to remain objective in this study. 
Significance of the Study 
This study is significant for four reasons. First is the importance of the 
freedom of speech in academia. A university must transmit existing 
knowledge and values to coming generations. It also must critically 
reexamine existing knowledge and search for new knowledge and values in 
an attempt to facilitate orderly change in society. To perform these functions, 
professors ought to have broad First Amendment protection for what they say 
or write. Justice Frankfurter writes: 
To regard teachers -- in our educational system, from the 
primary grades to the university- as priests of our democracy is 
therefore not to indulge in hyperbole. It is the special task of the 
teachers to foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical 
inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn, 
make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion .. '.they 
cannot carry out their noble task if the conditions for the practice 
of a responsible and critical mind are denied to them. They 
must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and 
action, into the meaning of social and economic ideas ... they 
must be free to sift through evanscent doctrine, qualified by time 
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and circumstance, from that restless enduring process of 
extending the bounds of understanding and wisdom, to assure 
which the freedoms of thought, of speech, of inquiry, or worship 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States against 
infraction by national or State government. Wieman v. 
Updergraff (1952, pp.196-197). 
Since freedom of speech for professors is important to the academy, it 
follows that administrators and faculty members alike need a better 
understanding of a professor's First Amendment free speech rights. ff higher 
education professionals were more aware of legal precedents, fewer 
controversies would erupt. Thomas Emerson (1970) emphasized that the 
benefits of the legal system are realized only when the individual knows the 
extent of his rights and has some assurance of protection in exercising them. 
To do that, professors must have some precision and clarity in understanding 
First Amendment rights. First Amendment scholar Chafee agrees: "It is 
increasingly important to determine the true limits of freedom of expression 
so that speakers and writers may know how much they can properly say, and 
government may be sure how much they can lawfully and wisefully 
suppress" (p. 3). 
The third reason supporting such a study is that it is unique. The 
literature is peppered with a plethora of studies on a professor's academic 
freedom. Some articles have been written about the faculty member's free 
speech rights as it relates to one area (i.e., classroom speech) and about public 
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public school teachers' First Amendment rights. But no project similar to this 
was found.3 
A fourth reason for the study's importance is tied to the future. At the time 
of this writing, Internet is quickly becoming a fixture at colleges and universities 
worldwide. Also, at this writing, First Amendment issues - some that deal with 
professors - are also surfacing. While legal experts are unsure exactly how courts 
will deal with these cyberlaw issues, it is likely that the precedents will come, in part, 
from past professorial speech cases. Therefore, a clearer understanding of legal 
precedent on today's First Amendment free speech protection for professors will 
assist future researchers in ferreting out future decisions concerning the Internet. 
Issues To Be Examined 
A review of the literature shows that the professorial speech question 
resembles a legal octopus because it reaches into a plethora of areas - academic 
freedom, tenure, institutional autonomy, contract law and ethics to name a few. 
Consequently, any study must focus its effort on one particular area. In this study, 
that area is how federal courts analyze the First Amendment freedom of speech 
rights of the publicly employed professor. 
With that focus in mind, this study looks at three classifications of 
professorial speech (i.e., academic bickering, classroom speech and out-of-class 
3 According to one informal survey, 252 dissertation projects have been done since 1861 on First Amendment 
issues. Most of those focused either on religious (i.e. separation of Church-State) questions or on issues 
involving the media. Only 11 of the 252 (approximately four percent) of the First Amendment studies 
concentrated on higher education faculty members. Of the 11, nearly half (five) dealt with the broader, yet related. 
concept of academic freedom. Only two studies of the 252 looked a professorial speech: a 1979 dissertation on 
out-of-class speech for both teachers and professors and a 1985 study on teachers' "knowledge" of their First 
Amendment rights. Given the fact that those studies are now 16 and 10 years old, respectively, a more up-to-date 
and concentrate examination of professorial speech law is needed. 
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expression). More specifically, the following issues are examined: 
1. Are more free speech disputes taking place in federal courts in the 1990s than in 
the past? 
2. Have the courts consistently applied United States Supreme Court precedents to 
the three types of professorial speech (i.e., classroom, out-of-class and academic 
bickering)? 
3. Are professors today more likely to lose free speech disputes than those in the 
past? Stated another way, has the First Amendment free speech protection afforded 
by courts declined in the 1990s? · 
4. How have the courts examined the different classifications of professorial speech? 
For example, is classroom speech given more or less constitutional protection than 
out-of-class speech? Does speech uttered in academic bickering disputes receive less 
constitutional protection than other out-of-class speech? Has the level of protection 
for each of these classifications declined in the 1990s? 
5. Do federal courts use the concept of a:91.demic freedom when deciding professorial 
speech disputes? What impact does the concept have in free speech questions? 
6. Do federal courts offer more First Amendment free speech protection to tenured 
professors than they do non-tenured ones? 
Organization of Paper 
The rest of the paper will be divided into four chapters. Chapter 2 will 
include a literature review of how a professor's rights to freedom of speech 
have evolved, a discussion of the United States Supreme Court precedents 
and a review of the different types of speech (i.e, classroom, out-of-class and 
academic bickering). Chapter 3 will discuss the research methodology used in 
the study. The research findings as they relate to the aforementioned issues 
will be examined in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will include a summary of those 
findings, conclusions, recommendations and implications for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Since the days of Socrates, a professor's freedom to speak has often 
times been a controversial issue. It began as a fight for academic freedom and 
later developed as a battle for First Amendment free speech rights under the 
United States Constitution. While significant strides have been made in 
protecting the expression of professors in the classroom as well as outside of 
it, the literature shows that the free speech dilemma continues to be a 
Pandora's Box for academicians and judges alike. 
Part of the Pandora's Box is the fact that not all professorial speech is 
analyzed the same. The literature shows that courts place a higher premium 
on some professorial speech as compared to other types. The legal analysis of 
speech uttered in the classroom is different than expression spoken or written 
outside the class setting. Different types of out-of-class speech also require 
separate standards. While, in some respects, the analysis is not much 
different than any other First Amendment case, it certainly creates a dilemma 
for those in higher education. 
This chapter provides a selective review of the literature. It starts with 
a discussion of why federal litigation on professorial speech claims is 
increasing in the 1990s. The next section shows that problems with 
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professorial speech have been constant in American higher education history. 
The third part of the chapter discusses significant United States Supreme 
Court precedents that, for the most part, have provided the foundation for 
legal analysis of professorial speech cases. Following the review of important 
United States Supreme Court cases, the review discusses why professorial 
speech can be broken into three classifications and reviews the literature for 
each classification. Finally, the literature discusses how academic freedom 
and tenure relates to a professor's free speech is examined. 
Professors And Free Speech: Courtroom Battles Increasing In The 1990s? 
A recent glance at The Washington Post or The Chronicle of Higher 
Education certainly suggests that free speech disputes are more prevalent this 
decade than in any other time in United States higher education history. 
Illustrative of this is a 1994 case where the University of New Hampshire 
suspended tenured writing professor Donald Silva after he made the 
following classroom comments to his technical writing students: 
Focus is like sex. You seek a target. You zero in on your subject. 
You move from side to side. You close in on the subject. You 
bracket the subject and center on it. Focus connects experience 
and languages. You and the subject become one (Silva v. 
University of New Hampshire, 1994, p.2). 
Silva's comments, which also included the discussion of a vibrator 
under a plate of Jell-0, prompted some female students to file sexual 
harassment complaints against him. The university investigated, found 
12 
Silva in violation of its sexual harassment policy and suspended the 59-year-
old tenured professor. Silva filed suit and, in 1994, a federal court ordered 
UNH to re-instate Silva. 
About the same time, a controversy erupted at the City College of New 
York. Jeffries, department chair of the CCNY Black Studies Department, gave 
an off-campus speech in Albany, New York where he made anti-Semitic 
remarks. Fueled by public complaints by people .such as then-New York 
Governor Mario Cuomo, CCNY officials reduced Jeffries' term as chair to one 
year. 
Jeffries sued, arguing that his off-campus speech should be protected · 
under the First Amendment. The case, which was appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court, served as a lightning rod to academic freedom and 
feminist groups alike and received nationwide attention. A federal trial court 
found that Jeffries' First Amendment rights had been violated, but an 
appellate court later reversed the decision. 
Other examples of free speech disputes in the 1990s between faculty 
member and institution also are easy to find. A 1996 decision found that a 
professor's classroom discussion of diversity in the workplace was not 
protected speech .. At the University of Minnesota-Duluth, professors and 
administrators waged a First Amendment battle in 1994 after a photograph of 
two gun-toting professors was removed by campus officials (Oakes, 1994). The 
University of Michigan sociology department precluded professor David 
Goldberg from teaching a graduate class after students complained about his 
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"racist'' comments in class (Chait, 1993). The University of Nebraska charged 
a woman graduate assistant with sexual harassment for comments she made 
during a Human Sexuality course. (Henhof, 1994). At Brigham Young 
University, English professor Cecilia Konchar Farr's contract was not renewed 
because she expressed pro-choice views on the abortion issue (Stimpson, 
1993). 
These cases and others around the nation suggest that the free speech 
problem is more prevalent today than ever before. Why do professorial 
speech disputes appear to be increasing? No clear answer emerges, but at least 
four factors merit discussion. 
The first factor, depicted by the Silva case, is an effort by institutions to 
stop student sexual harassment (Drummond, 1993). Facing potential liability, 
institutions are attempting to educate professors and students about the 
consequences of harassment more than ever. This has generated tension 
between the professor's First Amendment rights and the institution's 
responsibility to protect its students. 
The second factor, portrayed by the Jeffries case, is a result of what some 
see as "political correctness." Political correctness is defined as "marked by a 
progressive orthodoxy on issues involving race, gender, sexual affinity or 
ecology." (Random House, 1991). Institutions are attempting to eliminate 
"racist" or "sexist" language from campus by using speech codes (Matsuda, 
1989). Although these codes, for the most part, are at aimed at students, more 
and more universities appear to be more vigilant in applying similar 
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standards to faculty·members. 
Another factor is the rising costs and dropping enrollments at state 
universities nationwide. Administrators, searching for short-term solutions 
to retrenchment issues, are taking a much closer look at permissible grounds 
for dismissal. Such attempts to dismiss often times end up with the faculty 
member alleging a First Amendment violation. 
The fourth factor as to why professorial speech is a more explosive 
issue this decade than before may be linked, in part, to changing court 
attitudes. Several commentators maintain that recent United States Supreme 
Court decisions such as Hazelwood v. K uhlmeier (1988) and Waters v. - -
Churchill (1994) have watered down the First Amendment rights of 
educators. 
In sum, the literature clearly shows that a dilemma exists in higher 
education in the 1990s. But as the next section explains, the problems of 
professors and free speech surfaced long before this decade. In fact, American 
higher education has grappled with the issue for centuries. 
Academic Freedom, Free Speech and the Professor: 1791-1940 
The issue of professorial speech and academic freedom can be traced 
back as far as Socrates when he was charged and eventually sentenced to 
death for corrupting the youth of Athens. 
For the purposes of this review, however, the discussion picks up in 
the 1700s. Individual academic freedom was virtually non-existent as the 
church either controlled or heavily influenced American colleges. 
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Institutional leaders emphasized traditional subject matter, discouraged 
debates over controversial issues such as slavery and federalism and gave the 
faculty· members little autonomy. 
The tide shifted in 1859 when Charles Darwin published his hypothesis 
on evolution in the Origin of Species. As more and more scientists (and 
professors) became interested in Darwin's work, religious opposition grew. 
Some faculty members began an objective search for the truth (i.e., the 
"scientific method"), leading to conflict between the traditionally religious-
oriented hierarchy and the newly inspired scientific community. Walter 
Metzger (1955) described the conflict: 
Inevitably as science converted to evolution and the curriculum 
was converted to science, the heresies broached by Darwin bid for 
academic acceptance. This was inevitableand not at first far-
reaching, but in the catastrophic vision of the faithful, where 
small things loomed as great and innocuous acts as enormities, 
the attempt to teach evolution seemed part of a devilish plot. 
Determined efforts were made in the sixties~ seventies and early 
eighties to hold the line of education by the tactic of exclusion 
where possible, by threats and tirades where necessary. Synods 
gave warnings to trustees and trustees instructed presidents to 
reject the applications of Darwinians. Attacks in the local 
pulpits, alarms in the religious press, were employed to make 
colleges toe the mark and professors mend their ways. Once 
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again, a battle of ideas became a battle for the schools (p. 326). 
The second factor influencing more autonomy for American professors 
came from Germany. The German institutions, which educated several 
prominent leaders in American higher education, gave professors wider 
latitude in what they could say and do within the university. When German-
trained academicians came home, they brought the idea with them. 
The third factor signaling a need for additional professorial freedom 
was the influence of big business on higher education. At first, the marriage 
of academia and corporate American worked well as schools strapped 
financially turned to wealthy businessmen for help.4 But the influence did 
not stop with the multi-million dollar donors as boards, once stockpiled with 
clergyman, now began to recruit businessmen. This soon caused excessive 
tension between professors -- especially those who dared to publicly express 
concerns about business - and the powerful business interests. 
As a result of these factors, disputes over professorial speech surfaced. 
For example, in 1856, University of North Carolina professor Benjamin 
Sherwoc:>d Hedrick publicly opposed slavery and supported the Republican 
party. His colleagues criticized him, students hung him in effigy and the 
trustees dismissed him (Plopper et al., 1979). In 1874, Vanderbilt University 
fired professor Alexander Winchell for writing an article on Darwinism. In 
4 For example, dwing that time frame, John Hopkins University received $3.5 million from a Baltimore 
merchant; Leland Stanford Junior University received $24 million form the railroad kind and the founder of 
Standard Oil donated $34 to the University of Chicago. These gifts, unheard of during that era, changed the 
relationship of donor to recipient The donor wanted more than a passive role and administrators -- who had a 
vested interest in keeping the donors happy - often gave in to their whims (Hofstadter et al., 1955). 
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1893, the University of Chicago dismissed professor Edward Bemis because he 
publicly criticized the railroad industry. In 1894, Richard T. Ely, an economics 
professor at the University of Wisconsin, faced a trial for heretical and social 
economic writings. In 1900, Stanford University fired professor Edward Ross 
for his views on coolie labor and silver (Hofstadter et al.,1955). 
These disputes between faculty member and institution encouraged 
professors to seek protection for what they say or write. In 1900, the Academic 
Economic Association had the first professional inquiry into individual 
academic freedom. That inquiry fizzled, but it set the stage for the beginning 
of the American Association for University Professors ("AAUP") in 1915. 
One of the first AAUP priorities was to work out the scope and limits 
of "academic freedom." The Committee A's Report on Academic Freedom 
and Academic Tenure's fundamental premise called for academic freedom to 
be a necessary condition for a university's existence. The Committee 
emphasized that professors, when in the classroom, should be limited only by 
the norms of neutrality and competence and that, outside the university, 
professors should have the same rights as other citizens, limited only by the 
obligation to observe professional decorum. 
The early efforts of the AAUP were unsuccessful, but in 1940, the group 
issued the Statement of Principles, which advocated freedom of speech for a 
professor both in and outside the classroom. It first emphasized that a 
"teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing [his or her] 
subject but he should be careful not to introduce into [his or her] teaching 
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controversial matter that has no relation to [his or her] subject." The 
Statement also read: 
the college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a 
learned profession, and an officer of an educational institution. 
When [a professor] speaks or writes as a citizen,[he or she] 
should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but 
[his or her] special position in the community imposes special 
obligations. 
As a scholar of learning and an educational officer, they should 
remember that the public may judge their profession and their 
institution by their utterances. Hence they should at all times be 
accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show 
respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort 
to indicate that he is not an institutional spokes[person].s 
The Statement helped American professors turn the corner in their 
struggle to acquire additional autonomy. Today the 1940 document is still 
considered ori.e of the most influential pieces in academic freedom history 
and also is significant because the free speech issue eventually made it to the 
United States Supreme Court. 
5 Discussion on the exact meaning of this "professional responsibility" standard has been debated since the 1940 
statement. Today, it appears the AAUP considers the standard of academic responsibility to be an "admonition 
rather than a statement for the application of discipline." 
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Significant United States Supreme Court Precedents 
"Congress shall pass no law ... abridging the freedom of speech," reads 
the First Amendment. Absolute words? Not according to the courts, which 
offered a constricted interpretation of the language all of the 1800s and 
through the first half of this century. A 1892 opinion by Massachusetts 
Supreme Court Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes illustrated this. "There are few 
employments for hire," Holmes wrote, "in which the servant does not agree 
to suspend his constitutional right to free speech ... The servant cannot 
complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him." 
(McAuliff v. Mayor of New Bedford. 1892~p. 517). 
The 1927 Scopes Monkey Trial is a more relevant reference point for 
educators. The question was whether John Scopes, a Tennessee public high 
school teacher, could be fined for teaching any theory that denied the story of 
the divine creation of man as taught in the Bible, in violation of a state 
statute. The Tennessee Supreme Court said he could, emphasizing that 
Scopes, as edu:catorhad no right or privilege to serve the State except upon 
such terms as the State prescribed. 
A few years prior to the Scopes decision, however, the pendelum 
started moving toward freer speech in the United States Supreme Court. In 
Abrams v. United States (1919), the Court upheld a conviction against several 
individuals who had printed and distributed anti-war circulars, but Holmes, 
in a dissenting opinion, wrote that "it is only the present danger of 
immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting 
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a limit to the expression of opinion"(p. 618). This idea eventually made its 
way to the majority's position in the nation's highest court. 
Although an extensive historical review of free speech analysis is 
beyond the scope of this review, it should be noted that, following Abrams, a 
string of Supreme Court decisions slowly expanded First Amendment 
protection for individuals. These cases balanced the First Amendment free 
speech rights of individuals versus other governmental interests. 
For academicians, however, the change began in the 1950s and 1960s 
when a series of cases arose from the widespread efforts of states requiring 
public employees, particularly teachers, to swear oaths of loyalty to the State 
and reveal the groups with which they associated reached the United States 
Supreme Court. 
The Academic Freedom Decisions: 1952-1966. 
In Adler v. Board of Education (1952), the Court upheld a loyalty oath 
requirement for public employees, including teachers, in the New York state 
school system. But Justice Douglas dissented and warned that the New York 
procedure to deal with subversive persons raised ''havoc with academic 
freedom." He wrote: 
The law inevitably turns the school system into a spying project. 
Regular loyalty reports on the teachers must be made out. The 
principals become detectives; the community becomes 
informers. Ears are cocked for tell-tale signs of disloyalty. The 
prejudices of the community come into play in searching out the 
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disloyal. This is not the usual type of supervision which checks 
into a teacher's competency; it is a system that searches for 
hidden meanings in a teacher's utterances (pp. 509-510). 
The next significant "academic freedom" case was Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire (1957). A statute allowed the Attorney General to investigate 
"subversive" persons. The Attorney General subpoenaed Sweezy, a guest 
lecturer at the University of New Hampshire, and questioned him about his 
classroom discussions. The Supreme Court questioned the AG's actions, 
writing: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American 
universities is almost self-evident. No one should 
underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by 
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket 
upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities 
would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is 
so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries 
cannot be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, 
where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. 
Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and 
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to 
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die 
(pp. 1211-1212). 
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Nine years later, the Supreme Court again discussed academic freedom 
in Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1966). A New York law required faculty 
members at a state university to sign a certificate that would help state 
authorities determine if they were "subversive." Some faculty members 
refused to sign a certificate that they were not Communists and were 
dismissed. The Supreme Court struck down the law: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic 
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not 
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is~ special 
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws 
that cast~ pall of orthodoxy over the classroom ... The classroom 
is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas (p. 684). 
The Supreme Court's decision in Keyishian gave "academic freedom" 
an underpinning in constitutional law through the First Amendment. For 
the purposes of this review, it acknowledged that universities and professors 
should have institutional freedom from external influences. It also set the 
stage for a case where the Supreme Court would decide the free speech rights 
of a public high school teacher. 
The Pickering Precedent 
In 1964, high school teacher Marvin Pickering sent a letter to a local 
newspaper that criticized the way the Board of Education and the district 
superintendent had handled proposals to raise new revenue for schools. The 
letter also questioned the board's subsequent allocation of financial resources 
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between the school's educational and athletic programs and charged the 
superintendent of schools with attempting to prevent teachers in the district 
from opposing or criticizing the proposed bond issue. Pickering was 
dismissed. 
Pickering sued, claiming that the letter was protected under the First 
Amendment "free speech" clause. The Board, however, claimed Pickering's 
dismissal was justified because the letter was "inaccurate" and because it 
impugned the "motives, honesty and integrity, truthfulness, responsibility 
and competence" of both the Board and the school administration. The Board 
also asserted the letter incited "controversy,· conflict and dissension" among 
teachers, administrators, the Board of Education and the district's residents. 
In a landmark decision for teacher speech, the United States Supreme 
Court rejected the board's argument. The problem in such a case, the Court 
wrote, was balancing the teacher's interests (as a citizen commenting on 
matters of public concern) against the State's interests (as an employer 
promoting efficiency of the school). After analyzing several factors, the Court 
found that "absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by 
him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance 
may not furnish the basis of his dismissal from public employment" 
(Pickering v. Board of Education, 1968, p. 574). 
The Tinker Precedent 
A year later, the United States Supreme Court decided a First 
Amendment free speech case involving student speech. In Tinker v. Des 
24 
Moines (1969), several students wore black armbands to their schools and 
were immediately suspended. The Court, however, found that the 
suspension violated the students' First Amendment rights. ''Neither public 
school students nor teachers," the Court wrote, "shed their constitutional 
rights at the schoolhouse gates." The fact that schools officials feared some 
type of disruption was not enough to overcome the students' First 
Amendment rights. Explained the Court: 
Undifferentiated fear or apprehension is not enough to 
overcome the right of freedom of expression. Any departure 
from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation 
from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, 
in class, in the lunchroom, or on .the campus, that deviates from 
the views of another person may start an argument or cause a 
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk. (p. 
737). 
The Mt. Healthy Precedent 
The next decision relevant to this review is Mt. Healthy v. Doyle (1977). 
This time a teacher had made comments on the radio concerning a recently 
adopted (and controversial) dress code. A month later, his contract was not 
renewed. Doyle sued, contending the school's actions violated his First 
Amendment right to free speech. 
The Court remanded the case. In order for Doyle to win his First 
Amendment claim, the court required two things: that his conduct was 
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constitutionally protected and that the school had failed to renew his contract 
because of such conduct. Once he established that, the burden shifted to the 
school to prove that it would have reached the same decision, even in the 
absence of the protected speech. This additional procedure, the Court 
reasoned, served two purposes. First, it would remind the employer that she 
must have a reason other than a constitutional violation to discipline an 
employee and, second, the analysis discouraged employees from simply 
raising a First Amendment claim to circumvent just discipline. Wrote the 
Court: 
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the 
employment question resolved against him because of 
constitutionally protected conduct. But that same candidate 
ought not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his 
employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a 
decision not to rehire on the basis of that record (p. 575). 
The next significant United States Supreme Court case, Givhan v. 
Western Line Consolidation School(1979), expanded the Pickering ruling. In 
Pickering, the letter-to-the-editor was made public, but the Givhan decision 
said a teacher's private communication (e.g., spoken to a colleague or 
supervisor), if a matter of public concern, also was protected under the First 
Amendment. 
The Three-Prong Connick Test 
The most important case influencing professorial speech came when 
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the United States Supreme Court decided Connick v. Myers (1983). 
District Attorney Connick transferred Myers, an assistant district 
attorney. Myers then circulated a questionnaire to her colleagues about issues 
such as transfers, morale, the need for a grievance committee, confidence in 
supervisors and whether employees felt pressured to work in political 
campaigns. Connick fired her. Myers sued, arguing that her First 
Amendment right to speech was violated. 
The question for the Court, taking into account the Pickering ruling, 
was whether the questionnaire was a "matter of public concern." To make 
this determination, the Court noted that whether an employee's speech 
addresses a matter of public concern is determined on the content, form, and 
context of a given statement as revealed by the whole record. 
Of the 14 questions on Myers' questionnaire, the Court found 13 did 
not address a matter of public concern. However, one question ("Do you feel 
pressure to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported 
candidates?) was viewed by the Court as a matter of public concern. Since 
question 11 was speech dealing with a matter of public concern, the Court 
proceeded to the balancing test used in Pickering: Was Connick's interest in 
having an effective and efficient office outweigh Myers' right to free speech? 
The Court found for Connick because he reasonably asserted the 
questionnaire interfered with day-to-day operations of his office: 
Myers' questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in 
only a most limited sense; her survey, in our view, is most 
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accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning 
internal office policy. The limited First Amendment interest 
involved here does not require Connick tolerate action which he 
reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his 
authority and destroy close working relationships. Myers' 
discharge therefore did not offend the First Amendment 
(pp.1693-1694). 
The Connick test thus set forth a three-step analysis to govern speech 
by public employees, including teachers and professors. First, the court must 
determine whether the professor's classroom speech implicates a matter of 
public concern. A matter of public concern, as discussed in Connick and 
Pickering, is expression that relates to "any matter of political, social or other 
concern to the comtnunity''(p. 1690). Under Givhan, the speech in question 
does not necessarily have to be made public. 
Second, if the speech is deemed to be a matter of public concern, the 
court then employs the balancing test outlined in Pickering where the 
professor's First Amendment interests are weighed against the interests of the 
State in promoting the efficiency of the schools. In making this 
determination, the court may consider whether the speech impairs discipline 
by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on 
close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are 
necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes 
with the regular operations of the enterprise. 
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Third, if the professor prevails on steps one and two, then the third 
prong requires, under the Mt. Healthy precedent, the professor to show that 
her speech was a "substantial or motivating factor" in the employment 
decision. Once the professor meets that burden, the school must then show 
that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the protected 
conduct. 
The Hazelwood Precedent 
Five years after Connick came Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988). High 
school journalists wrote news articles about student pregnancy and divorce 
for the high school newspaper. The principal believed the stories were not 
suitable for publication and withheld them. The students sued, accusing the 
principal of trampling their First Amendment rights. 
The Court sidestepped the Tinker analysis, noting the question there 
involved a school's attempt to silence personal expression that just happens 
to occur at the school. The Court said the facts in Hazelwood involved "the 
educator's authority over school sponsored publications ... and other 
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school" (p. 571). In 
justifying the principal's actions, the Court fashioned the following test: 
"educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising control over the 
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities 
so long as their action are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns"(p. 571). 
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The Waters Precedent 
The final United States Supreme Court case relevant to the free speech 
of professors is Waters v. Churchill (1994). Nurse Churchill criticized her 
obstetrics department and her supervisor in front of another employee. The 
conversation, which was overheard, was reported to Churchill's boss and the 
public hospital discharged Churchill. She sued, claiming her First 
Amendment free speech rights had been violated. 
The Supreme Court did not agree with Churchill, but the import of the 
case to professorial speech is the procedure a government employer must 
follow in free speech cases. Prior to Waters, courts typically decided the facts 
for themselves and then conducted their free speech analysis. In Waters, one 
of the issues, however, focused on what was actually said. Nurse Churchill's 
recollection of her speech differed from her employer's version. Churchill's 
recollection, i.e., complaints about cross-training in her unit, arguably was a 
matter of public concern. The hospital's version indicated the speech was 
merely a personal grievance and therefore not of public concern. Thus, the 
Court had a dilemma: Should }he Connick test be applied to the speech as the 
hospital officials found it to be, or should it apply it to the speech that was 
actually said?6 
The Court held that a government employer should not have to be as 
precise as a jury when deciding what was said. Instead, the state employer 
6 Prior to ~. courts usually determined the facts of the situation themselves. In a non-jury trial, the judge 
would examine the evidence and a jury would make findings of fact in a jury trial. 
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need only conduct a reasonable inquiry into the content of the speech before 
acting. 
Therefore, Waters comes into play as a part of the Three-Prong test. 
When applying the test, courts are to examine the reasonableness of the 
employee's inquiry into what was said and the other facts in the case. If the 
inquiry is reasonable, the facts, as the employer found them to be, will govern 
- regardless of what .actually was said. 
Summary of Precedents 
In sum, the professor has traveled a long and winding road in seeking 
First Amendment freedom of speech protection from the United States 
Supreme Court. It began with Sweezy and Keyshian, which emphasized the 
need for free expression in the classroom ("academic freedom is a special 
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall 
of orthodoxy over the classroom") . 
Next came the Pickering test that balanced the teacher's interests (as a 
citizen commenting on matters of public concern) against the State's interests 
(as an employer promoting efficiency of the school.) The Tinker case then 
reminded administrators that they must reasonably forecast "substantial 
disruption or material interference" with school activities before punishing 
students or teachers for their speech. 
Following Tinker, Mt. Healthy mandated that the speech in question be 
a 11motivating" or 11substantial" factor in the employer's decision to discipline 
or dismiss the teacher. And, in Connick, the Court framed the 
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aforementioned Three-Prong test: (1) Is the speech a matter of public concern; 
(2) Balance the teacher's interests as a citizen commenting on matters of 
public concern against the State's interests as an employer promoting 
efficiency of the school; and (3) The speech must be a "motivating'' or 
"substantial" factor in the teacher's discipline or dismissal. 
Finally, the Hazelwood precedent allowed schools more control on 
student expression "so long as their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns." In Waters, the Court altered the procedure 
used by employers when handling speech cases. 
The next section will discuss one type of analysis that could clear up 
some of the confusion, although not all of it. Professorial speech traditionally 
has been divided into separate arenas or categories. Such a classification 
makes the issue easier to examine. 
Types of Professorial Speech 
Courts have traditionally treated certain kinds of speech separately 
from others. For example, political speech is afforded more protection than 
commercial speech. Commercial speech, in turn, is deemed more worthy 
than low value expression such as obscenity. No matter what area, courts 
generally classify speech either in terms of its value to society or in balance 
with other constitutional concerns. The same situation applies to professorial 
speech. Ever since the Pickering decision, courts and scholars have divided 
speech by professors into different categories. 
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A fairly easy illustration of how professorial speech is divided into 
classes or categories can be gleaned by simply looking at the titles of articles on 
the subject. Miller (1973) wrote "Expression Outside the Classroom." Francis 
(1978) penned "Breach of Responsibility in Extramural Utterances." Eagle 
(1984) wrote "First Amendment Protection For Teachers Who Criticize 
Academic Policy'' and Barber (1992) authored ''No Talking In Class." Jurenas 
(1990) wrote "Biting The Hands That Feed Them: Can Faculty In Public 
Colleges and Universities Criticize Their Employers And Survive?" 
In addition, the 1940 Statement discussed different classifications of 
speech. There seemed to be little disagreement among the drafters 
concerning the importance of protecting intramural or classroom speech ( "a 
teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject but he 
should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter that 
has no relation to the subject.") 
However, according to Metzger (1990), the same cannot be said for 
extramural speech. The Statement was co-authored by AAUP representatives 
and officials from the Association of American Colleges, an organization 
composed of undergraduate institutions and run by their top administrators. 
Those pushing for extramural expression had found that professors were 
more likely to be punished for expressing unpopular ideas in a public forum 
than for anything they said or did in the lab and thus wanted language 
protecting such speech. The AAC, on the other hand, wanted institutional 
loyalty to be placed above the individual professor's freedom of expression. 
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The two sides eventually settled their differences with the following 
language: 
the college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a 
learned profession, and an officer of an educational institution. 
When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he should be free from 
institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in 
the community imposes special obligations ... As a man of 
learning and an. educational officer, he should remember that 
the public may judge his profession and his institution by his 
utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, should 
exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the 
opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that 
he is not an institutional spokesman. 
The 1940 Statement divided speech into two groups: intramural and 
extramural. The first is intramural or classroom speech, which is fairly self-
explanatory. The other is "extramural" speech. It calls for the professor to be 
"free from institutional censorship or discipline" when writing or speaking as 
a citizen. In addition, it notes that, as a person of learning and an educational 
officer. the professor should be "at all times be accurate, should exercise 
appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and 
should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional 
spokesman." 
The number of categories. however, varies in the literature. The 
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AAUP has a two-tier classification. Katz (1983) divided speech into two 
categories (classroom and outside class). Jueng (1990) described a faculty 
member's internal grievances as "academic bickering." Poch (1993) divided 
his analysis into speech uttered in the classroom, expression as a part of 
research and publication, speech in their role as citizens and expression 
involving personal concerns. Kaplin (1995) treatise is similar: (1) classroom 
speech, (2) the professor's research and publication activities, (3) institutional 
affairs and (4) private life. 
But Emerson (1970) implies that a three-tier classification would work. 
He wrote that a faculty member is constantly engaged in various forms of 
expression, not only as a [1] teacher and scholar in the classroom, but [2] as a 
citizen of the university community and . [3] as a citizen of the outside world. 
Van Alstyne (1970) also arguably talked about three classifications in his 
distinction between general extramural speech and speech critical of a school 
or university (along with classroom speech). 
The Supreme Court and other federal courts also appear to view speech 
in one of three categories. Keyshian warned against casting a "pale of 
orthodoxy over the classroom."· Tinker focused on expression outside the 
classroom as did Pickering and Mt. Healthy. Connick , although not a 
education-related case, centered on an employee's internal complaints with 
her boss. 
In sum, little question exists that courts, scholars and the institutions 
themselves define professorial speech in a variety of ways. At a minimum, 
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professorial speech is divided into at least two categories, intramural 
(classroom) and extramural (outside the classroom) and as many as four. Yet, 
for the purposes of analyzing court decisions, a three-tier system seems 
reasonable: (1) Speech taking place inside the classroom, (2) Speech taking 
place outside the classroom, which includes research and publication, and (3) 
academic bickering. This is the classification used for this study. 
A Literature Review of Out-of-Class Speech Cases 
The diversity of cases in this category complicates the legal analysis. A 
1972 dispute concerned anti-war protests by faculty. A professor in a 1976 
decision called some of his colleagues "punks" at an academic senate meeting. 
A 1977 case involved a professor denied tenure because he had talked to the 
CIA about his research. A dispute in a 1980 decision focused on a faculty 
member's letter to the state department of finance that turned in the 
university president for using improper dealer tags. In 1989, a professor 
publicly accused other faculty members of exchanging grades for sex. In a 1992 
case, a sociology professor wrote a journal article questioning the intelligence 
of African-Americans and the 1995 Jeffries' decision involved an off-campus 
speech. No clear definition emerges from the literature, although it can be 
defined generally as when a professor speaks or writes outside the classroom. 
Although there is little discussion in the literature, speech that takes 
place solely in the professor's role as private citizen is the most protected 
(Kaplin 1995). For example, if a faculty member complained to a state 
legislator about the environment (if indeed it was wholly unrelated to his job 
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as a professor) she would be protected much the same as any citizen. Likewise 
speech that takes place outside the school likely will be constitutionally 
protected. The more difficult question is the professor who speaks or writes 
inside the school or in the role of a faculty member. 
Historically, the question of out-of-class speech has remained 
controversial and somewhat inconsistent. Pickering, the first Supreme Court 
case involving out-of-class speech, involved a teacher's letter that was critical 
of the school board's actions. The Court engaged in a balancing test where the 
free speech rights of the teacher were weighed against the State's interest in 
running the school. Part of the balancing test included evaluating the 
following factors: Does the speech impair discipline by superiors or harmony 
among co-workers? Does the speech have a detrimental impact on close 
working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are 
necessary? Does it impede the performance of the speaker's duties or 
interferes with the regular operations of the enterprise?" In Pickering's case, 
none of those factors was present and so the speech was protected. 
Miller (1974) examined out-of·:dass speech cases by whether the 
expression took inside or outside of school. He concluded that, under 
Pickering, statements made by teachers outside the school will generally 
qualify for First Amendment protection, even if "strongly critical" of the 
school administration. However, he also noted that courts were inconsistent 
in speech taking place inside the school yet outside the classroom. Some 
would apply Pickering, others would use Tinker or a combination of the two. 
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Eagle (1984) examined cases involving teacher criticism of academic or 
administrative policies. She found that teachers would most likely win the 
Pickering balancing test unless the school could prove the speech caused a 
serious disruption or actual, substantial and material interference. Miller 
(1974) reaches a similar conclusion. 
The tables, however, changed considerably with the 1983 Connick 
decision. As discussed earlier, the decision required courts to first determine 
whether the speech in question was a "a matter of public concern" prior to 
advancing to the Pickering balancing and Mt. Healthy substantial factor tests. 
A matter of public concern, the court wrote, is expression that relates to "any 
matter of political, social or other concern to the community." To determine 
what speech is of public concern, the Court instructed lower courts to judge it 
on the "content, form, and context of a given statement as revealed by the 
whole record." 
Connick, according to the literature, impacted a professor's ability to 
speak or write outside the classroom. First, it added an additional hurdle to 
the Pickering/Mt. Healthy test. More importantly, however, the decision did 
not clearly enunciate what was meant by a "matter of public concern." This 
has led to a plethora of articles about the inconsistency of lower courts on this 
issue. 
A 1986 article examined teacher speech cases and found that courts had 
a difficult time determining what was a political or social or other concern to 
the community. It noted that courts appeared to be influenced not only by 
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how employers characterized the speech but also by the fact if the speech was 
broadcast on the media. The article further warned: 
The present status of teachers free speech rights is alarming 
... there is no uniformity among the circuits in their attempts to 
apply the Connick test, a teacher desiring to speak has no notice 
of which speech will be beyond the limits .... to justify adverse 
employment action. In effect the teacher's Free Speech Rights 
are chilled due to uncertainty of when protection is available. 
The uncertainty is further aggravated by the vagueness of what 
Connick calls political, social or other concern to the community 
(p. 247). 
Allred (1988) also discussed the inconsistency of the "public concern" 
prong. His thesis was that certain groups of speech will receive more 
protection than others. For example, Allred concludes that First Amendment 
protection is more likely if the speech centers on a matters of current 
community debate than any other type. This is especially true if such matters 
have received recent attention in the community through the newspaper or 
some other public vehicle. 
A second category likely to be considered a matter of public concern is 
speech alleging malfeasance or abuse of public office. ''If the speech concerns 
malfeasance or abuse of office," Allred writes, "and the employee speaks as a 
concerned citizen, not as an aggrieved employee," (p. 62) the courts appear 
likely to find that the speech is of public concern. 
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Allred also suggests that speech on public safety and welfare, speech on 
the quality of public education and speech on discriminatory practices may be 
considered a matter of public concern unless the public employee is 
embroiled in some sort of personal dispute with the employer. But, according 
to the study, "matters of purely personal interest'' generally will not be 
viewed as a matter of public concern. 
Despite his analysis, however, Allred, acknowledges what most legal 
scholars conclude: the legal definition of public concern, which triggers 
whether speech will be protected, is far from clear. Following his analysis of 
Connick and how it influenced teacher free speech rights, Ryan (1988) wrote: 
Rights thought sacred by the First Amendment are, under the 
current Pickering-Connick test, in jeopardy. Teachers are much 
more susceptible to government action in violation of the 
Constitution because they, unlike others, rely on the 
government for a monthly paycheck. Instead of recognizing the 
vast influence that governmental action can have on a teacher's 
communicative activity, courts have chosen to vindicate the 
rights of the government as employer. Tipping the scales in this 
fashion assures that our most valuable educational resources, 
our teachers, will be muzzled (p. 717). 
For the most part, Connick and its progeny is the last significant case 
concerning out-of-class speech by professors, but the 1994 Waters decision 
could impact professorial speech. Waters appears to make it easier for an 
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administrator to curtail the speech of an employee for at least two reasons. 
First, the Court held that the actual facts (as found by a jury or judge) of what 
was actually said will not be used in the analysis - only the facts that the 
employer, after conducting a reasonable inquiry, believed them to be.7 
Second, employers need only substantially show that the speech likely 
interfered with school operations, not that an actual disruption occurred. 
Jeffries v. Harleston (1995). 
Leas (1994) opined that the Waters decision enhanced institutional 
autonomy while, at the same time, reduced individual individual freedom of 
speech. He acknowledges that specific implications of the decision are "far 
from clear'' but said the decision, coupled with the nation's "politically 
correct'' climate, raises a red flag. 
In sum, the literature concerning out-of-class speech makes four key 
points. First, the three-prong test of Connick is the precedent most frequently 
applied to out-of-class speech cases today. Second, courts historically have 
protected speech taking place outside the school more than they have inside 
of it. Third, professors had broader free speech protection for what they said 
outside of class from 1968 to 1982 -- the time between the Pickering and 
Connick decisions. Fourth, Connick negatively impacted the professor's free 
speech rights outside of class and, in any regard, has been applied 
inconsistently by lower courts. Fifth, while it is too early to tell the 
7 As explained in a concurring opinion by Justice Souter "a public employer who reasonably believes a third-party 
report that an employee engaged in constitutionally unprotected speech may punish the employee in reliance of 
that report, even if it turns out that the employee's actual remarks were constitutionally protected." 
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ramifications of the Waters decision, some believe it will further reduce the 
free speech rights of professors. 
Academic Bickering 
Academic bickering generally takes place when faculty criticize their 
employers or colleagues. Such speech may take the form of a dispute with the 
department head or, in some cases, a professor charged with incompetency 
may raise a First Amendment claim in this category (i.e., where does free 
speech leave and insubordination begin?) The standard generally used by 
courts is the Three-Prong analysis (Kaplin,1995). 
In dealing with these cases, the courts "must distinguish valid criticism 
from academic bickering; the honest critic from the cantankerous malcontent; 
and the whistleblower's legitimate complaints of administrative malfeasance 
from the carping of a social misfit" (Jurenas, 1990). 
Two studies on this issue merit discussion. A 1984 study examined the 
First Amendment rights of public school teachers who criticize academic 
policy. Eagle (1984) found that courts will not grant first amendment 
protection if the speech can be characterized as ''bickering," "running 
disputes," or a personal grievance. Eagle also noted that her study suggested 
that courts "appear to give additional although unspoken weight to tenured 
teaching in retaining their positions." 
A study (Jurenas and Zhang, 1990) looked at public faculty members' 
criticism of employers. It concluded much the same thing that Eagle did: 
42 
universities will likely prevail. The Jurenas study noted that the First 
Amendment will not shield faculty from an institution's adverse 
employment decision if other valid reasons exist for that decision. In 
addition, attempts to convert a faculty member's disruptive or antagonistic 
interpersonal relationship with administrators into a constitutional issue will 
likely fail. 
A final point to make on "academic bickering'' cases is that it appears 
the faculty member has a most difficult time - similar to the out-of-class cases 
-- overcoming the "public concern" hurdle. The Court in Connick 
emphasized "that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon 
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of 
personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is 
not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel 
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's 
behavior'' (p. 1690). 
In sum, the literature suggested that the "academic bickering'' category 
is one where the institution typically will win because the speech in question 
is not be a matter of public concern. Also, unlike the other two categories, it 
appears that courts are consistent when dealing with a professor's personal 
grievance or petty bickering about an administrative decision. 
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A Literature Review of Classroom Speech Cases 
Katz (1983) discussed two ways a dispute over classroom speech may 
erupt. First, an issue may arise because the professor speaks of controversial 
public issues extraneous to the particular subject matter assigned. Second, the 
professor's teaching methods, including topics of classroom discussions, use 
of certain words, and interjection of personal ideological or philosophical 
viewpoints may lead to administrative disapproval and reprisal.s 
The problem in resolving such disputes is based, in part, on a lack of a 
United States Supreme Court precedent directly addressing a professor's First 
Amendment freedom of speech rights in the classroom (Clarick, 1990). 
Consequently, as the literature suggests, as many as four major precedents 
have been applied to classroom speech cases: The Three-Prong Connick test, 
Keyshian/Sweezy, Tinker, and Hazelwood. Needless to say, it has often 
times made the case law inconsistent. 
Van Alstyne (1970) said the degree of a teacher's freedom in the 
classroom was controversial. He based his reasoning on an analysis of 
Epperson v. Arkansas (1968), a case where the Supreme Court struck down an 
Arkansas law prohibiting the teaching of evolution. He noted that Epperson 
placed no reliance upon any constitutional claim of the teacher to some 
degree of in-class protection and, as a result, did little to clarify the speech 
issue. 
8 The literature also indicates that classroom speech must be linked to the subject matter of the class. Olivas 
(1993) said "academics who engage in careless teachiung or make major misrepresentations in disseminating 
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A study by Katz (1983) suggested that the situation had improved little 
by the 1980s. After reviewing the relevant Supreme Court precedents, she 
concluded that the courts were much more likely to side with the institution 
than they were with the professor in a classroom controversy. She 
summarized her findings as follows: 
Current constitutional doctrine ... does not support any 
superprotected status for classroom utterances. The truth is that 
classroom speech enjoys less protection than more ordinary 
speech ... Professors ... are more vulnerable than the average 
citizen to be being penalized for speech, even outside the 
classroom. Rather than providing a sanctuary for the robust, 
freewheeling expression of views, some which may be 
unpopular or even dangerous, the classroom, even at a 
university, provides a forum in which speech may be sharply 
curtailed (Katz, 1983, p. 859). 
A 1992 article painted a similar picture. Barber (1992) examined Bishop 
v. Aronov (1991), a case from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals tha.t held 
a University could prevent a professor from discussing his religious beliefs in 
human physiology class. Bishop had made occasional comments about his 
beliefs in class and in some after-class meetings. Some students complained 
and administrators at the University of Alabama ordered him to refrain from 
ideas may be entitled to less protection than those who teach controversial topics within their area of expertiese" 
(p. 1844). 
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making such statements. 
The court, in making its ruling, relied on Hazelwood for guidance. 
''Educators do not offend the First Amendment," the court wrote," by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student [or professor] 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns" (p. 1074). The court also 
emphasized that the university had the "authority to reasonably control the 
content of its curriculum, particularly the content imparted during class 
time"(p. 1074). 
Barber opined that such a ruling, if followed by other courts, could give 
students more free speech rights than faculty members and concluded such a 
decision appeared to hinder free speech in the classroom and "undermine the 
goals of higher education in this country." 
Barber is not the only one criticizing the use of Hazelwood in 
relationship to classroom speech. One commentator, for example, described 
the ruling as a "jurisprudential cloud" that could lead to a substantial 
chilling of the classroom academic freedom of individual teachers in public 
educational institutions on all levels (Academic Freedom Advisory et al., 
1994). By applying such a precedent, the courts further signal that classroom 
speech in higher education can be governed in much the same way as lower 
education (Luna 1995). 
Kaplin (1995) does not paint quite as bleak a picture as Katz or Barber, 
but he writes that "courts are generally reticent to become involved in 
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academic freedom disputes concerning course content, teaching methods, 
grading, or classroom behavior, viewing these matters best left to the 
competence of administrators and educators who have primarily 
responsibility over academic affairs." 
The above discussion illustrates a repeated theme in the literature. 
Classroom speech is often times not protected and the reason courts typically 
use is that a university should be able to control its own curriculum and 
content. Stated another way, institutional autonomy prevails over 
individual autonomy. 
Another string of studies worth mentioning in the literature review 
concerning classroom speech are those focusing on public school teachers. 
In the past 20 years, several dissertations have examined courts' treatment of 
public school teachers. 
For example, a 1976 dissertation by Sponseller examined 40 cases 
examined prior to 1974 and concluded that the board of education could 
dismiss a teacher (without violating the First Amendment) for things such as 
(1) allowing a vulgar poem to remain on the blackboard, (2)permitting 
assembly programs to the student body that are obscene and calculated to 
cause disruption, (3) reading a vulgar story to a class and (4) distributing 
obscene and improper reading materials to an eighth-grade class. 
A 1979 study by Plopper surveyed 46 cases, most of which were decided 
in the 1970s. He found that courts generally rule in favor of school 
administrators when teachers have (1) used speech that has disrupted normal 
47 
school operations, (2) flagrantly violated reasonable demands of their 
superiors and (3 used speech of such an offensive nature that it either 
destroyed interpersonal working relationships or otherwise adversely affected 
students and other members of the community. 
Conversely, Flopper concluded that courts have generally supported 
teachers when school administrators have (1) overreacted to teachers' private 
and public criticism of school personnel or policies, (2) failed to provide 
adequate procedural safeguards during the dismissal process and (3) 
attempted to limit teachers nondisruptive political speech. Flopper also 
noted that teachers prevailed about half of the time and concluded that both 
administrators and teachers alike did not have a clear understanding of the 
First Amendment issues involved. 
A 1986 study by Prichard found that teacher speech is more likely to be 
protected if it is related to the curriculum, there was no disruption, the class 
consists of older students and if the teacher otherwise has a good record. He 
further noted that a teacher's case is strengthened if the teacher's right to 
communicate correlates with the student's right to receive information and 
that school administrators will usually lose if they are inconsistent in 
enforcing rules or acts without knowing the relevant facts. 
In 1989, yet another study involving in-class expression by public 
school teachers was conducted. Among the relevant findings in the legal 
analysis were: (1) It is more difficult for teachers to prove their First 
Amendment rights of speech and expression in the classroom have been 
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violated; (2) the courts have been consistent in not protecting proselytizing in 
the classroom; (3) courts have protected teachers' rights to determine their 
teaching methods, within limits and (4) school officials' rights to restrict 
teachers' speech, and expression in the classroom has become more complex. 
The studies involving public school teachers are important for two 
reasons. First, many of the cases involved an analysis of Pickering and Tinker 
- the same standard sometimes used for examining professorial speech by 
today's courts. Second, it appears the courts treat lower education and higher 
education similarly. 
The studies of public school teachers' right to speak cases suggested 
that, while First Amendment protection was available, the teacher is more 
likely to lose than win the dispute. These findings seem consistent with 
university classroom cases. Concludes one author: 
The extravagant language of the Supreme Court on academic 
liberty has undoubtedly been sincere and well-meant, but it has 
created expectations of meaningful individual classroom liberty 
that cannot be met under either the concrete reality of its 
jurisprudence or the practicalities of university governance and 
autonomy. Rather than enjoying hyper-protected status under 
the first amendment, university classroom speech can be sharply 
curtailed (Katz, 1983, p. 932). 
Therefore, the classroom speech literature is summarized as follows. 
First, it is the murkiest category of the three. Unlike out-of-class and 
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academic bickering cases, where the Three-Prong test is most often applied, 
courts haye applied a variety of precedents to classroom speech issues. The 
Three-Prong, Tinker, Hazelwood, Keyshian and Sweezy all have been used in 
classroom cases in the past 28 years, making the case law inconsistent. 
Second, the literature indicates that courts are more likely to side with the 
institution than the individual professor in disputes over classroom 
expression. Third, courts appear to treat higher education much the same 
they do lower education. Finally, along the same lines, it appears that the 
situation may even get worse for professors in the 1990s. Hazelwood, a case 
dealing with student speech at a high school, has been applied to the 
university classroom and, in effect, gives institutions even more control over 
what takes place in a classroom. 
The next section is closely related to the classroom speech issue. 
Academic freedom, often times described as omnipresent by faculty members, 
obviously plays a role in professorial speech questions, but it is unclear as to 
how significant that role is. 
Academic Freedom And Its Impact On Professorial Speech 
No precise definition exists for academic freedom. The concept 
encompasses several constitutional rights and includes contract law. The 
First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution fall 
under the academic freedom umbrella. If the AAUP Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure or other customs or practices are formally placed into a 
professor's terms of employment, then contract law also comes into play. 
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However encompassing academic freedom seems, much of the 
literature suggests that courts are either confused by the concept or simply do 
not rely on it as a matter of law. Byrne (1989) wrote "there has been no 
adequate analysis of what academic freedom the Constitution protects or why 
it protects it. Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine floats in 
law, picking up decisions as a hull does barnacles." Feldon (1989) describes 
the legal meaning of academic freedom as a ''hollow phrase" and notes that it 
is seldom a significant factor in faculty free speech cases. Other articles point 
out that courts give more legal substance to institutional academic freedom 
than individual rights of professors. Other commentators such as Emerson 
(1970) have also questioned whether the concept has any independent 
existence apart from general free speech precepts: 
The Supreme Court has never undertaken to establish academic 
freedom as an independent constitutional right, in the same 
way, as example, as it created the constitutional right of privacy. 
The Court has simply used the principles of academic freedom 
for support in the application of traditional legal doctrine. It has 
resolved issues in terms of freedom of expression, establishment 
of religion, due process, the rule against vagueness, or similar 
constitutional principles. Thus academic freedom factors weigh 
in the balance in determining First Amendment rights under 
the balancing theory ... But it is by no means clear that the results 
reached in any of the cases would have been different had the 
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academic freedom element been missing (p. 610). 
In 1984, Holbrook conducted a detailed study as to how federal courts 
treated academic freedom claims. Among Holbrook's most significant 
conclusions was that litigation associated with faculty academic freedom was 
precipitated primarily by terminations of non-tenured faculty members. She 
also found that the litigation was most often initiated by politically liberal 
faculty at comprehensive institutions. Furthermore, Holbrook discovered 
that courts have not consistently distinguished faculty academic freedom 
from institutional autonomy nor recognized either concept as absolute. She 
wrote: 
Although overall these [courts'] decisions indicated strong 
support for these [free speech] rights, several decisions implied 
that institutions need not tolerate vulgarity and obscenity in 
speech. Some indicated further that such speech should receive 
greater tolerance in situations which included only professionals 
than in situations that included students as well ... overall, this 
judicial approach implies considerable institutional 
independence in determining faculty terminations and suggests 
a claim that the termination violates the faculty member's 
academic freedom will be difficult to sustain (p. 249). 
A study by Zirkel four years later, in 1988, painted a much bleaker picture 
than did Holbrook. Zirkel 's study encompassed more than just "free speech" issues, 
but his results are relevant to this study. Of the 59 cases examined between 1977 and 
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1988, only 16 cases specifically mentioned academic freedom. And in all the cases --
which either "implicitly or explicitly'' discussed academic freedom - educators won 
nine (32 percent). This prompted Zirkel to describe academic freedom as a ''live but 
limited legal construct'' in modem court decisions. One of his closing paragraphs 
succinctly illustrates his findings: 
The results of the analysis are sobering for the faculty member in 
higher education who might drink too deeply of the bottle 
labeled 'academic freedom' as an euphoric cure for various 
problems with colleagues, administrators and external 
governmental agencies ... Regardless of the faculty member's rank 
and discipline and regardless of whether she or he is nontenured 
or tenured, whether the adverse action is the denial of a salary 
increment or the loss of employment, whether the expressive 
conduct is within or outside the classroom, and whether the 
academic freedom is explicit or implicit, the outcomes of the 
reported court decisions clearly favor the defendant college or 
university rather than the plaintiff faculty member (p. 811). 
In sum, academic freedom, as a legal concept, carries little weight with 
the federal courts. Courts seem more interested in defending institutional 
autonomy rather than an individual professor's free speech rights or 
academic freedom. 
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Tenure As It Relates To Freedom of Speech 
Similar to academic freedom, tenure is not well-defined and can have 
different meanings depending on the institution and other circumstances. 
Katz admitted this, but wrote: ''Tenure is a concept that does not admit of any 
one definition, but if it means anything, it means the holder cannot be 
discharged without cause." The institution of tenure is designed to guard the 
faculty member against dismissal for political or other inadmissible reasons 
and to assure an economic security in which the professor can carry on a 
search for truth in teaching and research. It also has been described as the 
"chief device for assuring the faculty member freedom as a teacher, scholar 
and citizen" (Emerson, 1970, p. 594). A tenured professor also is afforded 
more procedural due process protections (e.g., notice and a hearing) than non-
tenured ones. 
The issue of tenure and how it may relate to free speech cases is not a 
new one. In ~ v. Sindeman (1972), a non-tenured junior college professor 
who was the president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association 
publicly disagreed with his school's policies and became embroiled in a 
variety of disputes with administrators.· His contract was not renewed and 
Sindemann sued, claiming his First Amendment free speech rights had been 
violated. 
The junior college where he worked argued that, since Sindemann's 
contract was on a year-to-year basis, it had the right to terminate him without 
a hearing or any additional procedures. The United States Supreme Court 
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agreed, but stated: 
It [the college] may not deny a benefit to a person on the basis 
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests - especially 
his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could 
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally 
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms 
would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow 
the government to produce a result which it could not 
command directly (p. 2697). 
The Perry ruling indicates that professors without tenure should be 
legally treated the same as those who have tenure, but the question remains 
as to whether that indeed has been the fact. 
Bailey (1987) concluded that her study showed non-tenured professors 
have the same First Amendment rights as tenured ones. However, Eagle 
(1984) reached a different result in examining public school teacher cases. She 
concluded that teachers with tenure are afforded an extra but "unspoken 
measure of protection." Eagle also noted that her findings indicated it would 
be much more difficult for administrators to demonstrate that the First 
Amendment activity has so disrupted his or her employment responsibilities 
as to warrant discharge. She further explained: 
Without a property interest such as tenure, the non-tenured 
teacher has no right to a statement of reasons for non-renewal 
or a hearing on a decision not to rehire. A non-tenured teacher 
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is generally not claiming violation of a contractual right since 
the contract has expired. Therefore, it is considerably easier in 
such a situation for the school administration to assert, or for a 
court to hold, that the decision not to renew is within the 
administration's prerogative to reduce friction among the 
faculty. (Eagle, 1984, p. 236). 
Katz (1983) supports Eagle's conclusions. She notes that a nontenured 
faculty member cannot be dismissed, denied a contract renewal or denied 
tenure if the primary reason underlying the decision was an intention to 
deny the professor's First Amendment rights. However, she adds that, in 
practice, nontenured faculty members alleging retaliation for protected 
expressive activity may be unable to meet the burden of proving illicit intent 
without knowing the reasons for the institution's decision. 
Summary 
Chapter 2 can be summarized as follows. First, the literature clearly 
shows that professorial speech is an increasing problem in today's institutions 
of higher education and has been a controversial issue through American 
higher education history. Second, while there is no direct United States 
Supreme Court precedent that specifically focuses on speech by professor, a 
line of decisions from the 1950s to 1994 guides lower courts on the issue. The 
results have been both inconsistent and, as a general rule, more favorable to 
administrators trying to stifle speech than professors seeking to exercise the 
First Amendment rights. 
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Furthermore, professorial speech can be classified into three groups: 
classroom speech, out-of-class speech and academic bickering. The laws 
surrounding classroom speech appear to be the most murky as courts seem to 
pick and choose among the various precedents. The laws involving 
classroom speech and academic bickering seem to be applied more even-
handed, although questions remain as to what constitutes a "matter of public 
concern." 
Finally, the literature is unclear as to what impact academic freedom 
and tenure have on courts' analysis of professorial speech disputes. Academic 
freedom, while an often cited term by academicians, seems to be ill-defined 
and has little significant weight in First Amendment analysis. Tenure, on the 
other hand, also appears to have little weight in the courts' decisions on 




Ninety-nine published decisions from 1968 to 1996 were examined to gain 
more knowledge into how federal courts analyze professorial speech issues to 
address the six issues stated in Chapter 1: First, are more free speech disputes taking 
place in federal courts today than in the past? Second, have the federal courts 
consistently applied United States Supreme Court precedents to the three types of 
professorial speech? Third, are professors more likely to lose free speech disputes 
today than in the past. Fourth, How have the courts examined the different 
classifications of professorial speech i.e., classroom, out-of-class, academic bickering, 
in the past 28 years? Fifth, do federal courts rely on the concept of academic freedom 
when deciding professorial speech disputes? Sixth, do federal courts offer more 
First Amendment free speech protection to tenured professors than they do to non-
tenured ones? 
Below is a brief explanation of precedents, legal analysis and legal 
reasoning and a discussion of the specific methodology used to examine the 
six issues. 
Introduction 
Jensen and Horvitz (1979) say that legal decisions rest upon the pattern 
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of facts set before the bar (Danelski, 1966).9 The judges pick and choose from 
facts found in legal briefs, facts revealed by the evidence, and facts that 
originally occurred in nature (Reed, 1970). The facts that the judge considers 
both "true and important" are used to form the basis for the decision. This is 
the concept of ratio decidendi: a judge applies a rule of law to a combination 
of facts contained in the set of circumstances presented by the litigants in 
order to reach a decision. 
Legal questions also require an extensive review of precedent. Stare 
decisis, an abbreviation of the phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere (to 
stand by what has been decided and not to disturb settled points), is the Latin 
term that explains the important of precedence. Legal scholar Roscoe Pound 
(1922) explains why precedents are important: 
the chief cause of our success of our common-law doctrine of 
precedents as a form of law is that it combines certainty and 
power of growth as no other doctrine has been able to do. 
Certainty is insured within reasonable limits in that the court 
proceeds by analogy of rules and doctrines in the traditional 
system and develops a principle for the cause before it according 
to known techniques. Growth is insured in that the limits of 
principle are not fixed authoritatively once or all but are 
discovered gradually by a process of inclusion and exclusion as 
9 One of the roles of the legal system is to "mark and guard the line between the sphere of social power, organized 
in the form of the state, and the area of private right (Emerson, 1970, p. 12). To do this, courts have typically 
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cases arise which bring out its practical workings and prove how 
far it may be able to do justice in its actual operation (p. 121). 
Another way to explain precedent is as follows: ''The previous 
treatment of occurrence X in manner Y constitutes solely because of its 
historical pedigree, a reason for treating X in manner Y if and when X again 
occurs" (Schauer, 1987, p. 571). For the purposes of this study, Xis the 
professor who claims his First Amendment free speech rights have been 
violated. Y is how courts have resolved these free speech disputes. 
Stated another way, to what degree are courts relying on the Connick 
precedent when deciding whether a professor has First Amendment 
protection for speech uttered outside the classroom? What precedents are 
courts relying on when deciding disputes involving in-class speech? 
Academic bickering? Are the courts consistently following these precedents? 
To answer this question, the study discerned the legal reasoning used 
by judges in all published federal courts cases focusing on a professor's First 
Amendment free speech rights. To do this, the case method, which requires 
each case to be briefed or summarized, is used. Once each case is briefed, the 
researcher can collectively draw conclusions based on the similarities and 
differences of the court's reasoning. A brief discussion about the "case 
method" and legal reasoning appears below. 
served as mediator between the government and the people, including in free speech disputes. The methodology 
in this study centers on an analysis of the courts' role in the professorial speech question. 
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The Case Method And Briefing 
The "case method" relies on the analysis of judicial opinions to 
identify the principles of law. The technique, usually used in law schools, has 
been acknowledged as a valuable dimension of legal research in other fields 
as well. Case analysis, also called the "case method," is, to some degree, the 
application of content analysis to court decisions. Holbrook (1984) writes: 
The fundamental aspects are the same; both content analysis and 
the case method depend on objectivity, system and generality. 
Although the quantitative approach could be used to assess the 
frequency of particular content items in a series of court 
decisions, the common law school briefing technique is 
primarily a qualitative approach due to its focus on occurrence 
rather than frequency (p. 80). 
According to Llewellyn (1951), case analysis assumes four things about 
a court's decision. First, the court must decide the dispute before it. Second, 
the court can decide only the particular dispute which is before it. Third, the 
court can decide the particular dispute only according to a general rule that 
covers a whole class of like disputes. Fourth, everything -- big or small -
must be read in past cases with primary reference to the particular dispute. 
Legal Reasoning 
Legal reasoning refers to the arguments that judges give, frequently in 
written form, in support of the decisions they render. The researcher uses the 
case method in an effort to ferret out important and systematic information 
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on a particular judge's legal reasoning. 
Legal reasoning involves not only, and not primarily, the 
application of rules of formal logic but also other methods of 
exposition. To reason, according to dictionary definitions, may 
mean to give grounds (reasons) for one's statements, to argue 
persuasively, or to engage in discourse. Law, insofar as it has a 
distinctive subject-matter and is founded on distinctive 
principles and purposes, has not only its own kinds of logic, but 
also its own kind of rhetoric, and its own kinds of discourse, 
which are, of course, similar to but distinct from the logic, 
rheortic, and discourse of other social institutions and scholarly 
disciplines, such as religion, politics, social science, or economic 
activities (Berman and Greiner, 1972, p. 414). 
Berman and Greiner note that legal reasoning is logical in at least three 
ways. First, legal reasoning strives for consistency of rules and judgments. 
Second, it strives for continuity with the past and, third, it is dialectical in 
method. Inherent in all three elements is the most widespread form of logic, 
reasoning by analogy or the process of comparing and contrasting examples. 
The authors, however, point out that "a large area of indeterminacy" 
exists in reasoning by analogy because "the criteria for selecting similarities 
and differences are not definitively laid out but are open to debate"(Berman 
and Greiner et al., 1972, p. 421). On the other hand, however, they explain 
that analogical reasoning does impose limits on legal results: 
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In each society, there are some similarities and differences so 
strongly felt that the cannot be denied. Moreover, the range 
within which analogies may be found is often restricted by 
particular legal doctrines ... In addition, each legal system 
establishes procedures and methods for drawing analogies -
such as adversary and investigative procedures or the method of 
precedent and the method of codification -- and these procedures 
and methods are designed to prevent analogical reasoning from 
becoming arbitrary (Berman and Griener et al., 1972, p. 419). 
Edward Levi (1949) identifies a three-step process for how a judge 
legally reasons. In the first step, the researcher searches for a set of facts in 
previous case which are comparable to the case in question. Once this 
similarity is found, the researcher identifies the rule of law in the previous 
case. She then applies the rule of law to the present case. These steps are 
inter-related and a large measure of discretion is exercised by the judge in this 
process. While courts are bound by decisions in previous cases, they are not 
bound by the ratio decendi (reasoning of the decision) - only the court's 
holding. Writes Levi: 
Where case law is considered, and there is no statute, [the judge] 
is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the 
prior judge even in the controlling case ... It is not what the prior 
judge intended that is of any importance; rather it is what the 
present judge, attempting to see the law as E fairly consistent 
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whole, thinks should be the determining classification. In 
arriving at his result he will ignore what the past thought 
important; he will emphasize facts which prior judges would 
have thought made no difference (Levi et al., 1949, p.2).1° 
Research Procedures In This Study 
The Period of Study 
This legal study was based on selected published decisions by federal 
trial and appellate courts from 1968 until 1996. Federal courts were selected 
because most cases involving faculty free speech are typically brought under 
Section 1983, Title 42 of the United States Code. The four times frames were 
selected based on United States Supreme Court precedents. Pickering took 
place in 1968; Mt. Healthy was decided in 1977; Connick took place in 1983 
and the 90s were chosen to find out what was going on in this decade. 
Data Sources 
This legal study drew exclusively on court decisions, law reviews and 
journals, academic journals and historical commentaries. The primary 
sources of data were the court decisions as printed in the Federal Reporters 
and Federal Supplemental Reporters by West Publishing Company. 
The information found in the cases was supplemented by other 
primary and secondary sources. Dissertation Abstracts International, which is 
10 The standard position is that a judge is not bound by everything that was stated in the opinion on the prior case 
but only its ratio decidendi (the reason for decided the case in a given way). Most commentators also agree that a 
judge's attitude, experience and other factors may come into play when making a decision. 
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available on the Pro Quest database, was used to find studies relevant to the 
issue. The Index to Legal Periodicals also was used to locate law journal 
articles concerning the professorial speech question. Information found in 
various reference books and other databases also were used. The secondary 
sources used in this research included the legal and historical commentaries 
by both legal and academic scholars alike. In addition, some general 
publications such as newspapers and magazines were scanned to find the 
most recent conflicts on the issue. 
Data Collection 
The identification of potential court decisions for analysis in this study 
was first made by a computer database search using Westlaw. The search 
term "faculty professor teacher instructor employee Ip college university & 
''First Amendment" & "free speech" and date (after 12/31/1968) was 
conducted on Westlaw. This was designed to find all federal court decisions 
from 1968 until 1996 on the issue. This initial search produced 1,084 cases. 
The search then was cross-checked by looking up cases in the Federal Digests 
and scanning relevant law journal articles. 
Once the initial list was compiled, the cases were examined to 
determine if they (1) they dealt with a publicly employed professor and (2) 
whether the court did something more than a perfunctory analysis of the 
"free speech" claim. The cases were kept if they met both criteria. In addition, 
if while examining these cases, another decision was discovered, it, too, was 
added to the list. The final list included 99 cases. 
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Data Analysis 
Each case was then briefed and analyzed as discussed earlier in this 
chapter. The ''briefing" format for the purposes of this study included the 
following information: 
1. Title of the case which indicates the opposing parties. 
2. The case citation which indicates the volume and reporting system ,the 
page number and the year in which the case was decided. 
3. The cause of action and procedural history. 
4. The facts of the case as they are recorded in the court's opinion.11 
5. The issues or questions of law decided by the court. 
6. The precedent applied. 
7. The court's reasoning for making the decision. 
8. The disposition or what order was entered by the court as a result of its 
holdings. 
9. Commentary on the decision, which may include concurring and 
dissenting opinions or personal views by the author (Statsky and Wernet, 
1984). 
Of particular importance is the fact that the free speech claim was dissected 
from the remainder of the lawsuit. For example, if a professor had filed a due 
process claim in addition to a free speech cause of action, only the free speech claim 
11 It should be noted that the "facts" as record in the court's opinion should not be viewed as complete or 
necessarily accurate. "The facts [as found by the courts] are not what actually happens in a case," Judge Jerome 
Frank wrote. '"The actual events, the real objective acts and words ... happened in the pasL They do not walk into 
the courL The court usually learns about these real, objective, past facts only through the oral testimony of 
fallible witnesses ... The courL .. must guess at the actual facts" (Frank, 1949, p. 15). 
66 
was examined. Thus, a "win" or a ''loss," for the purposes of this study, deals only 
with the free speech claim, not the entire lawsuit. 
In addition, the following information for each case was noted: (1) Was the 
faculty member plaintiff tenured?, (2)What type of speech was at issue (classroom, 
out-of-class, academic bickering)?t2 and (3)Was academic freedom mentioned or a 
factor in the decision? Once the information was complied from each brief, it was 
then coded. A table was then set up with the following categories for each case: (1) 
outcomet3, (2) Name of court, (3) Type of dispute, (4) year the decision was 
published, (5) whether the professor had tenure, (6) what precedent was applied, (7) 
whether academic freedom was mentioned. Results were then placed in cross-tables 
and the analysis done.14 . The analysis for each of the six issues includes numbers. 
The numbers, however, were not statistically analyzed15 and should be viewed as 
illustrative. 
Once the results were compiled, the writing began. The writing focused on 
the issues discussed in Chapter 1 and identified both illustrative cases and trends 
among the cases as a whole. In addition, tables for each issue (e.g., academic 
freedom, tenure) were made. 
12 For the purposes of analysis, only one type of speech for each case was used in the cross tabulation. 
13 A "win" is classified as prevailing on the First Amendment claim. A "remand" is defined as a case being sent 
back to the trial court for further review or a decision that the case needs to go to trial. The study did not attempt to 
track down what happened after a case was remanded. 
14 The tabulations were done on Microsoft Excel. 
lS The decisions of the courts are not "mathematically inevitable" according to Bemer and Griener (1972), but 
"always contingent upon the exercise of [the court's] judgment" (p. 416). 
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Summary 
This chapter has provided the reader with a detailed explanation of the 
methodology employed in this study including how the cases were selected for 
examination, the nature of the legal analysis, and a discussion of the issues that will 




The study focused on how federal courts treat the First Amendment freedom 
of speech claims of publicly employed professors. To examine this issue, 99 
decisions published between 1968 and 1996 were briefed, coded and analyzed 
according to (1) outcome, (2) the type of speech at issue, (3) the year of the decision, 
(4) whether the professor/plaintiff had tenure, (5) what United States Supreme 
Court precedent was used in making the decision and (6) whether the court 
mentioned academic freedom or used it as a factor in the decision. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the study is framed by six issues. First, are more 
free speech disputes taking place in federal courts today than in the past? Second, 
have the federal courts consistently applied United States Supreme Court precedents 
to the three types of professorial speech? Third, are professors more likely to lose 
free speech disputes today than in the past? Fourth, how have the courts examined 
the different classifications of professorial speech i.e., classroom, out-of-class, 
academic bickering, in the past 28 years? Fifth, do federal courts rely on the concept 
of academic freedom when deciding professorial speech disputes? Sixth, do federal 
courts offer more First Amendment free speech protection to tenured professors 
than they do to non-tenured ones? 
The analysis addressed those questions as follows. First, the numbers show 
that litigation over professorial speech issues increased in the 1990s as compared to 
previous years. Second, although the United States Supreme Court has not 
specifically dealt with the professorial speech issue, the courts were generally 
consistent in applying the same precedents to out-of-class and academic bickering. 
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The same cannot be said for classroom speech cases. Third, professors are likely to 
lose First Amendment free speech lawsuits and it appeared their constitutional 
protection for freedom of speech has declined. Fourth, federal courts generally 
found the First Amendment protected a professor's out-of-class speech more than 
the other kinds of speech: classroom and academic bickering disputes. Fifth, courts 
seldom relied on the concept of academic freedom when deciding a free speech 
claim. Sixth, tenured professors fared about the same as their nontenured 
counterparts in free speech disputes. These findings are more fully explained below. 
ISSUE 1: ARE MORE FREE SPEECH DISPUTES TAKING PLACE IN 
FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 1990s THAN IN THE PAST? 
FINDING 1: FREE SPEECH LITIGATION BETWEEN INSTITUTION AND 
PROFESSOR IS TAKING PLACE MORE FREQUENTLY NOW THAN EVER 
BEFORE. 
The results showed that federal court decisions concerning professorial 
speech are more prevalent in the 1990s. As shown in Table I, from 1968 to 1976, 24 
cases involving professorial speech took place. The number increased to 25 
between 1977 and 1982, then dropped to 19 between 1983 and 1989. But 31 decisions 
have taken place from 1990 to January of 1996 - a substantial increase. 
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TABLE I 
NUMBER OF CASES BY TIME FRAME 





Grand Total 98 
Another interesting statistic that emerged was an increase in the number of 
tenured professors becoming embroiled in free speech litigation. Of the 32 cases 
involving tenured professors, three took place from 1968-1976, five from 1977-1982, 
eight in 1983-1989 and 16 from 1990-1996. Therefore, in the past 13 years (1983-1996), 
24 tenured faculty members filed suits compared to only eight from 1968 to 1982. 
Half of the 32 tenured professors filed lawsuits in the past six years. Those numbers 
suggested that tenured faculty members seeking First Amendment protection are 
more likely to resort to litigation now than ever before. The statistic also suggested 
that universities are less hesitant to discipline or dismiss tenured professors today 
than in the past. 
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ISSUE 2: HA VE THE FEDERAL COURTS CONSISTENTLY APPLIED UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS TO THE THREE TYPES OF 
PROFESSORIAL SPEECH? 
FINDING 2: THERE IS CONSISTENCY IN THE PRECEDENTS APPLIED TO 
THE FREE SPEECH CASES, ALTHOUGH PROBLEMS STILL EXIST. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Connick-Pickering-Mt. Healthy Three-
Prong test is the precedent most frequently used by courts in the analysis of 
professorial speech cases. Other precedents such as Tinker, Hazelwood, 
Keyshian, Sweezy and Waters also have been applied to free speech cases. 
TABLE II 
U. S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS BY TYPE OF SPEECH 
~of Speech 
Precedent Classroom Outside Bickering TOTAL 
Three-Prong 8 38 31 77 
Tinker 0 6 0 6 
Other 8 4 4 16 
At first blush, some consistency among the courts was shown as about 
three-fourths of the decisions relied on either the Three-Prong test, some 
variation thereof or on the individual precedents of Pickering. Mt. Healthy 
and Connick. The remaining cases used a variety of United States Supreme 
Court precedents in resolving the free speech issue, including some not 
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discussed in Chapter 2. 
The more important question, however, is how the "precedent'' is 
applied. In theory, courts should apply the same rules (i.e., precedents) to the 
same types of cases. For example, the same test would be used for all in-class 
speech cases or all out-of-class decisions. The courts, for the most part, were 
consistent in out-of-class and academic bickering cases. Such was not the case 
for classroom speech. Below is a more detailed explanation, including some 
illustrations on how the test was applied. 
In-Class Speech: A Muddled Picture 
Of the 16 classroom speech decisions, there appeared to be little 
consistency. Eight applied the Three-Prong test (or some variation) but two of 
those cases dealing with sexually harassing comments had different results. 
Another series of cases focused on the university's right to control the 
curriculum, including one that relied on Hazelwood. Four other cases used 
either Keyshian or Sweezy as a precedent. 
Three-Prong Test 
An application of the three-prong test is illustrated in is Cohen v. San 
Bernadino Valley College (1995) where a remedial English instructor used 
obscenities and pornography as a part of his classroom lectures. The question 
addressed by the court was whether a state college may limit the classroom 
speech of its professors to prevent the creation of a hostile, sexually 
discriminatory environment for its students. The court found that Cohen's 
subject matter was of public concern, but concluded the university's 
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right to preclude disruption of the educational mission through the creation 
of a hostile learning environment was more important than the professor's 
right to speak on sexual matters in an English class. 
A contrasting result was reached in the three-prong analysis in Silva v. 
University of New Hampshire (1994). Silva, like Cohen, used language 
alleged to be sexually harassing during his technical writing class. The court, 
however, found that Silva's comments were matters of public concern and 
that his right to speech outweighed the university's interest in precluding a 
sexually harassing environment. 
Hazel wood Precedent 
A third case in this group also merits discussion. In Bishop v. Aronov 
(1991), the court relied, in part, on Hazelwood to support the university's 
decision to reprimand a professor for discussing his religious beliefs in his 
human physiology class. The rule of law applied by the court stated that 
"educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control 
over the style and content of student [or professor] speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related 
to legitimate pedagogical concerns" (p. 1074). 
Tinker Precedent 
In Cooper v. Ross (1979), a non-tenured professor history professor 
informed his World Civilization and American Civilization classes that he 
was a communist, a member of the Progressive Labor Party and that he taught 
his courses from a Marxist point-of-view. The university, citing some of his 
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comments, failed to renew his contract. The court cited Tinker for the 
proposition that Cooper's ''bare announcement" of his personal views did not 
materially or substantially disrupt classes. In fact, the court noted, the 
incident caused "remarkably little concern until the matter was publicized by 
the media" and "the subsequent public reaction is not the kind of disruption 
that can be balanced against a teacher's right to free expression." The court 
also discussed Keyishian and Sweezy in the decision. 
Two-Tier Analysis and Curriculum 
In Mahoney v. Hankin (1984), similar to the issues in Bishop and Silva, 
the court focused on the university's control of the curriculum. While the 
court cited Keyishian and appeared to rely on the instructor's academic 
freedom, it applied a two-tier analysis. First, was the professor's speech 
related to the curriculum? If so, then the court indicated a balancing similar 
to the one applied in Pickering should be applied, which weighs the state's 
interest in restricting the in-class speech against the teacher's interests, with a 
special consideration on the teacher's exercise of academic freedom.16 
Teaching Style/Grading Practices 
The other classroom speech cases involved the professor's teaching 
style and/or grading policies. In Hetrick v. Martin (1973) and Hillis v. Stephen 
F. Austin Univers~ty (1982), the court focused more on the non-tenured status 
16 An alternative approach suggested by the court is the test used by the First Circuit: "Free speech does not grant 
teachers a license to say or write in class whatever they may feel like ... and ... the propriety of the regulations or 
sanctions must depend on such circumstances as the age and sophistication of the srudents, the closeness of the 
relation between the specific technique used and concededly valid educational objective, and the context and 
manner of the presentation." Mailloux v. Kiley (1971). 
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of the instructor and cited Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) for the proposition 
that a non-tenured teacher does not have a right to have teaching styles or 
grading policies insulated from review by her superiors. 
A similar approach was applied in Lovelace v. Southeastern 
Massachusetts University (1986) where a non-tenured instructor refused to 
"inflate" his grades or lower his teaching standards. "To accept plaintiff's 
contention," the court said, "than an untenured teacher's grading policy is 
constitutionally protected and insulates him from discharge when his 
standards conflict with those of the university would be fo constrict the 
university in defining and performing its educational mission" (p. 426). 
The Sixth Circuit, however, reached a different outcome under similar 
circumstances. In Parate v. Isibor (1989), a non-tenured professor gave a "B" 
to a student, but administrators ordered him to change the grade. The court 
cited Sweezy and Tinker in finding that ~'the assignment of a letter grade is 
symbolic [constitutionally protected] communication intended to send a 
specific message to the student'' (p. 827). 
In sum, of the 16 cases, courts used various approaches. Some applied 
the traditional Three-Prong test, giving no consideration to the professor's 
academic freedom rights. Some applied the test, taking academic freedom into 
account. Most required, at a minimum, some link between the speech and 
the subject matter of the class. One of the cases recognized that a university 
must establish clear standards or otherwise notify a professor if her teaching 
methods are unacceptable (Ross ,1979). Other courts gave more weight to 
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institutional automony than they did freedom of speech. 
Supreme Court Precedents As Applied to Out-of-Class Decisions 
Overall, 48 of the cases involved questions focusing on out-of-class 
speech. Thirty-eight (79 percent) of the courts applied the three-prong test, 
some variation thereof or relied on the individual cases of Pickering, Mt. 
Healthy or Connick. More significant, however, is the 20 of the 21 cases since 
the 1983 Connick decision used the Three-Prong analysis or some variation 
thereof -- an indicator that courts are following similar guidelines when 
ruling on these types of issues. 
Three-Prong 
A recent example of the Three-Prong application is Scallet v. 
Rosenblum (1996). In that case, the court examined the free speech claims of a 
business instructor who, during faculty meetings, attempted to persuade 
colleagues to include more classroom discussion about women and 
minorities in the workplace and "the ways in which issues of social 
responsibility in business could be incorporated into classroom discussions" 
(p. 1005). 
The court found that the diversity issue related to a matter of public 
concern, noting that "Scallet' s expressed desire to reconstruct cases to reflect 
, the psychology of women and African-Americans in the workplace, although 
curricular in nature, cannot be said to relate to matters solely of institutional 
or personal concern since it also speaks to the general debate on 
multiculturalism that currently thrives in all quarters of American society" 
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(p. 1014). 
Next, the court applied the Pickering balancing test to see if Scallet's 
exercise of free speech was outweighed by the "countervailing interest of the 
state in providing public service the teacher was hired to provide"17 (p. 1015). 
The court concluded that the university had offered no significant reason as 
to why its interest would outweigh Scallet's right to speak at the faculty 
meeting. 
Having found for Scallet on the first two prongs, the court shifted to 
the Mt. Healthy third step. The court ruled that Scallet's comments at the 
faculty meeting were not the motivating factor for the university's decision. 
Instead, it was his disruptive teaching style and inability to get along with his 
colleagues. 
Another case along the same lines is Idoux v. Lamar University (1993). 
The court found that Idoux's complaints about swapping of restricted and 
unrestricted funds and comments about improper practices by the faculty 
were of public concern. Second, the court held that Idoux's interests in 
communicating these matters easily outweighed the university's interest in 
promoting and administering an efficient university. But Idoux, like Scallet, 
lost when the court found that the university's decision to remove him from 
interim president did not involve his protected speech. The evidence 
showed, the court ruled, that the Board of Trustees was unaware of his 
17 The court in~. similar to other courts, changed the wording of the Pickering balancing test in regard to 
the State's interest. 
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Academic Bickering Precedents 
Another remarkably consistent application of U.S. Supreme Court 
precedents took place in the "academic bickering'' category. Of the 17 cases 
decided between 1983 and 1996, 16 (94 percent) courts applied the three-prong 
test or some variation thereof. Only Feldman v. Bahn (1993), a case where a 
professor wrongly accused his colleague of plagiarism, failed to apply some 
variation of the Three-Prong test. 
Little discussion needs to take place as the analysis in most cases was 
clear-cut. Courts simply found that the speech at issue, typically a personal 
grievance, did not address as a matter of public concern and, as a result, was 
not protected under the First Amendment. The second prong rarely came 
into play and, in other cases, the court concluded that the "speech" in 
question was not the substantial reason for the university's action. 
ISSUE 3: ARE PROFESSORS MORE LIKELY TO LOSE FREE SPEECH 
DISPUTES TODAY THAN IN THE PAST? STATED ANOTHER WAY, HAS 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH PROTECTION AFFORDED BY 
COURTS DECLINED IN THE 1990S? 
FINDING 3: PROFESSORS WIN FEW FREE SPEECH CASES AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION APPEARS TO BE SHRINKING IN THE 
1990S 
The most substantiated finding in this study is the fact that professors 
typically lose free speech litigation in the federal courts. Of the 99 cases examined 
between 1968 and 1996, professors lost 56 times (58 percent) and prevailed in 22 cases 
(22 percent). Twenty-one cases (22 percent) were remanded or proceeded to trial. 
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TABLE III 
RECORD OF PROFESSORS IN FREE SPEECH CASES 
N=99 
Time Frame Win Loss Remand 
1968-1976 5 14 5 
1977-1982 11 9 5 
1983-1989 1 12 6 
1990-1996 5 21 5 
Grand Total 22 56 21 
Issue 3 not only dealt with the overall record of the professors but also 
focused on the constitutional protection afforded faculty members in the 1970s or 
1980s as compared to today .. Were courts more likely to rule for professors in the 
1970s? In the 1980s? Today? As noted in Table ID, the number of remands in each 
time frame were similar, but the won-loss statistics varied greatly. 
1968-1976: The Early Years 
As discussed, the Pickering decision instructed the courts to balance the free 
' 
speech rights of the teacher against the school's need to efficiently function. At this 
time, neither Mt. Healthy nor Connick had yet been decided. 
Twenty-three decisions between 1968 and 1976 were examined. Professors lost 
14 of the decisions, won five and five were remanded. Of the 24 cases, 14 disputes 
involved out-of-class speech, seven focused on bickering and only two dealt with in-
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class expression. Twenty of the faculty members who sued during this time did not 
have tenure. 
Of the 24 cases, the courts, for the most part, relied on the Pickering balancing 
test. Of the five cases where the professor prevailed, courts found that the speech 
was protected, it was not disruptive and that the university had taken the 
disciplinary action because of that protected speech. In the cases where the 
university won, the courts either found that the professor's speech was disruptive or 
that the speech was not the reason for the discipline or dismissal. 
Cases Where Professors Prevailed 
In Pickings v. Bruce (1970), a church refused to allow five African-Americans 
to attend services. Consequently, a student group called SURE (Students for Rights 
and Equality) sent a letter to the church about the incident. In addition, the student 
group had invited two militant and controversial speakers to campus. The 
president of the university suspended SURE's charter and failed to renew the 
contracts of two faculty advisers. The advisers and students sued in federal court, 
asserting their First Amendment free speech rights had been violated. 
The trial court ruled for the university, but the Fifth Circuit reversed. 
Relying on Pickering and Tinker, the court reaffirmed that "students and teachers 
retain their right to freedom of speech ... while attending or teaching at a college or 
university'' (p. 598). The court acknowledged that the letter and invitation to the 
speakers exacerbated tension on campus, but that, in itself, was not enough to justify 
punishing the students and faculty for their speech. Several other cases during this 
time frame indicated that professorial speech would be protected unless the 
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institution could show that the comments significantly disrupted or substantially 
interfered with university operations. 
A similar case to Pickings was Smith v. Losee (1973). A junior college denied 
Smith tenure for his "anti-administration" attitude and for his role as faculty 
adviser to a student group that sent out controversial fliers for a local state senate 
election. The court found the speech to be protected and, as a result, the college 
erred in denying tenure. Professors also prevailed in Rampey v. Allen (1974) and 
Phillips v. Puryear (1975). In Rampey, the universitypresident terminated 14 
professors, tenured and non-tenured, after they held a press conference criticizing 
him. He said he believed they were divisive and overly critical. The court, 
however, concluded that .a college president does not have "absolute control" over 
what a faculty member says. The fact that the president disagrees with the 
professors' statements is not enough to show it burdened school operations. In 
Phillips, a professor bitterly complained about the unfairness of a committee report 
that recommended he not be rehired. The court said such speech, as long as it did 
not constitute true threats of harm, was protected.18 
Cases Where The University Prevailed 
An example of a case where the university prevailed is Rozman v. Elliott 
(1972). Rozman and other demonstrators, mostly students, staged a sit-in 
demonstration at the ROTC Building on the University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
18 The court based its ruling, in part, on Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942). In Chaplinsky, the court wrote: 
''There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which 
has never been through to raise any Constitutional problem. These included the lewd, and obscene, the profane, 
the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words -- those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any 
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campus. Rozman, a non-tenured faculty member, then became involved in tense 
negotiations with administrators who wanted the building vacated. After an all-
night stand-off and an order by the president to vacate the building, Rozman and 
several others refused to leave for several hours. Rozman's contract was 
subsequently not renewed for the following year because of his "disruptive" 
activities in the demonstration. 
The court found for the university. It found that Rozman had a First 
Amendment right to participate in the demonstration, but, once he began openly 
opposing administrators in the negotiations, he was "intermeddling'' in campus 
operations. Intermeddling, ruled the court, crossed the line between merely 
expressing an opinion and significantly disrupting campus operations. 
Of the remaining cases from 1968 to 1976, the university usually prevailed 
because the courts believed that the professor's "speech" was not the reason for the 
personnel decision. In Hetrick v. Martin (1973), a non-tenured English professor, 
argued that she was dismissed because she told her class that she was an "unwed 
mother'' and discussed the Vietnam war in class. But the court rejected Hetrick' s 
argument and found that the university had a right to terminate a non-tenured 
professor because her teaching methodology did not conform with the approved 
curriculum. Her teaching style - not her speech --was the reason for her dismissal. 
Wrote the court: 
[Academic freedom] does not encompass the right of a 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." 
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nontenured teacher to have her teaching style insulated from 
review by her superiors when they determine whether she has 
merited tenured status just because her methods and philosophy 
are considered acceptable somewhere within the teaching 
profession. (Hetrick, 1973, p. 709). 
Mt. Healthy: 1977-1982 
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court decided Mt. Healthy, which 
required the plaintiff to prove that her speech was the "substantial" or "motivating" 
factor for the university's actions. Nearly every case during this five-year period cite 
Mt. Healthy and, from a historical perspective, this time frame proved to be the 
most prosperous for professors seeking First Amendment free speech protection. Of 
the 24 cases examined, professors won 10 and lost nine. Five cases were remanded or 
held over for trial. 
Similar to the 1968-1976 era, most disputes surfaced after universities decided 
not to renew the professor's contract. Thirteen involved out-of-class speech and 19 
plaintiffs did not have tenure. 
Of the 10 cases where a professor prevailed during this time frame, the 
common denominator appears to be speech aimed at someone off campus, a 
situation where a professor ''blows the whistle" on an alleged improper or illegal 
university activity or a discussion about a university's financial practices. 
Speech To Off-Campus Audience 
An illustration of the former is Aumiller v. University of Delaware (1977). 
The comments of Richard Aumiller, an instructor and manager of auxiliary 
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services, concerning his homosexuality appeared in three newspaper articles. 
Following the publication of the articles, the university decided not to renew his 
contract for the following year. Aumiller sued. 
The court first found, relying on Pickering, that Aumiller's published 
comments were protected speech and also concluded that the comments served as 
the university's sole reason for not renewing his contract. "Homosexuality is an 
extremely emotional and controversial topic, "the court wrote, ''but this 
unpopularity can not justify the limitations of First Amendment rights .... the 
fundamental purpose of the First Amendment is to protect from State abridgment 
the free expression of controversial and unpopular ideas" (p. 1301). 
Whistleblowing/Financial Practice Cases 
The "whistleblowing" cases are best illustrated by Hickingbottom v. Easley 
(1980). Marion Hickingbottom, without consulting his superiors, wrote a letter to 
the Arkansas Motor Vehicle Department and reported that two cars furnished to the 
university president had "improper" dealer tags. The Motor Vehicle Department 
investigated and resolved the problem, but, once the president discovered who 
wrote the letter, Hickingbottom's contract was not renewed. 
The court, relying on Pickering and Mt. Healthy, emphasized that reporting 
violations of the law is of public concern. ''The interests of society in encouraging 
teachers, as well as other citizens, to speak out and report violations of the law far 
outweigh the interests of the College in preventing embarrassment'' (p. 985). The 
court also noted that Hickingbottom did not go public with his allegations, but 
reported it to the proper authorities. 
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United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents (1982) involved a professor who 
had frequently, including to persons off campus, alleged the university had 
misallocated research funds. Administrators subsequently canceled his travel funds, 
refused to give him general pay increases and changed his teaching assignments. 
The professor resigned and filed a lawsuit. The court, noting that the professor's 
speech was accurate, found that the university failed to prove that his "words so 
interfered with the operation of the institution as to justify terminating an 
otherwise competent teacher'' (p. 562). 
University Prevails 
The university generally prevailed during this time frame because courts 
found that speech in question was not a substantial factor for the discipline or 
dismissal. In addition, most of these disputes centered on academic bickering. 
Illustrative of the cases is Russ v. White (1981). Russ, dean of instruction at Garland 
County Community College, was fired after feuding with the president of his school 
over who should be hired as basketball coach. A coach was hired, but Russ -- whose 
responsibilities included the athletic department -- refused to take responsibility for 
overseeing him. Furthermore, Russ engaged in several heated arguments with his 
president. At one point, he told the president he needed "psychiatric help" and 
accused the president of being immoral, dishonest and manipulative. He also told 
the president to commit suicide. 
The court held that such language was not protected under the First 
Amendment, noting that Russ had no constitutionally protected right to express 
himself in a "unbusinesslike" and "unreasonable" manner." Dr. Russ was not 
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terminated for the expression of his opinion but rather the manner in which it was 
expressed," (p. 897) the court wrote. 
Connick: 1983-1989 
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court decided Connick v. Myers, a case 
that many believe watered down First Amendment protection for all public 
employees, including teachers and professors. As earlier discussed, in addition to 
applying the Pickering balancing test and the Mt. Healthy substantial factor 
requirement, Connick provided a more stringent standard on what constitutes a 
public concern. 
The negative influence of Connick seemed easy to spot in the analysis as 
professors won only one of the 19 cases decided between 1983 and 1989 -- the lowest 
of the four time frames. For example, in Mahaffey v. Kansas Board of Regents (1983), 
a tenured professor began to receive negative evaluations and subpar salary 
increases after he advocated that his parks and areas management program be 
accredited separately from the Forestry Department -- a view that did not sit well 
with his supervisor or colleagues. The court, relying on Connick, found such 
speech concerned an individual or private concern, not a public one. Similar results 
took place in Martin v. Parrish (1986) and Ballard v. Blount (1983). Neither Martin's 
profane language in class nor Ballard's salary concerns were a matter of public 
concern. 
The university prevailed in 10 other cases for two reasons. First, the courts 
found that the speech was not a "substantial factor" in the university's decision to 
terminate or discipline the professor. In Kellerher v. Flawn (1985), the court found 
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that a graduate student teacher was reassigned because of insubordination and 
failure to abide by department regulations. In Lovelace v. Southeastern 
Massachusetts University (1985), the court found that he had failed to adhere to 
university academic standards. 
The second reason focused on the disruptiveness of the speech. For example, 
in Maples v. Martin (1985), a group of faculty m~mbers were transferred after they 
conducted a survey of their department and distributed the results to an accrediting 
board, faculty, students and some alumni. The report, extremely critical of the 
department head, discussed the need for improvements. The court held that the 
report was of public concern but then concluded: ''The publication of the Review 
contributed to a lack of harmony a:tnong the faculty and interfered substantially with 
the regular operations of the Mechanical Engineering Department'' (p. 1554). 
Today's Litigation: 1990-1996 
The numbers improved slightly for professors seeking First Amendment free 
speech protection, but the outcome remained dismal. Of the 31 cases, professors 
won five and lost 21. Five were remanded. 
Professors Prevail 
Four of the five cases where professors prevailed involved speech that took 
place off-campus. In McCann v. Ruiz (1992), an associate Geology professor who 
also acted as Director of the Seismic Network for the University of Puerto Rico 
appeared on a radio program. On the program, he questioned the location of a coal-
induced power plant and said he believed the plant may represent a danger to 
Puerto Ricans because it would be too close to a potentially active seismic fault line. 
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The comments also appeared in a newspaper article. University officials1 
contending that McCann was a "troublemaker/' subsequently denied him tenure 
and his contract as director was not renewed. 
The court found that the speech was of public concern and that the 
universitts argument that his speech was not the reason for their actions·was 
"fanciful." The court also noted that the First Amendment interests of McCann in 
speaking out on a matter of public concern clearly outweighed the interests in 
maintaining an efficient department. Similar results took place in Roos v. Smith 
(1993) where a university attempted to punish a professor for testifying against them 
in a discrimination case and Barnett v. State of Wisconsin (1991) where the court 
ruled that a professor could not be prevented from talking to legislators about state 
funding. 
Universities Prevail 
In the cases won by universities1 eight courts1 relying on Connick, found that 
the professors' speech was not of public concern. Most of these cases1 however, were 
academic bickering disputes. In Colburn v. Trustees of Indiana University (1992), 
two sociology pr~fessorsl embroiled in departmental politics and upset over the 
management of the department1 wrote a letter to the dean of faculties. The 
professors subsequently were denied tenure. The professors' letter1 which was a 
request for external review of the department1 was made in the context of a faculty 
feud, the court reasoned. 
A second group of cases indicated the university prevailed because the court 
found the professor's speech not to be the substantial factor for the demotion or 
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dismissal. For example, in Idoux v. Lamar University (1993) a faculty member who 
was serving as interim president refused to consent to what he felt were 
unauthorized and unethical payments to the former women's basketball coach. He 
also opposed requests from improper "swapping'' of restricted and unrestricted 
university funds, permitting the faculty to engage in private enterprises at the 
university's expense and violations of the school's alcohol policy. Idoux was 
removed from the presidency after these comments. 
The court unequivocally held that allegations of mismanagement (such as 
the ones echoed by Idoux) almost always raises the "imprimatur of public concern." 
The court noted "the fact that the speech was delivered privately ... rather than to Bob 
Woodward and Carl Bernstein does not necessarily render the speech any less 
protected" (p. 1257). The court also found that Idoux's rights to speak outweighed 
those of the university. However, on the third prong; the evidence, concluded the 
court, did not show that the Board of Regents knew about Idoux' comments prior to 
their decision to dismiss him. Therefore, the speech was not the cause of the 
dismissal. 
Two other cases, decided after the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Waters v. Churchill, also favored universities. In the aforementioned Jeffries v. 
Harelston (1995), a case that had earlier made it to the Supreme Court, a department 
chair had given an anti-Semitic speech at an off-campus site. His term as 
department chair was reduced. Jeffries sued and the trial and appellate courts ruled 
in his favor. The Supreme Court, however, remanded and ordered the lower courts 
to review the Waters decision in regard to Jeffries' case. 
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On remand, the Second Circuit ruled that the university's action did 
not violate Jeffries' First Amendment free speech rights. The court held that 
the speech in question - namely comments about the New York state public 
school curriculum and black oppression -- was a matter of public concern. 
But it then concluded that Waters required the university only to show a 
likely interference - not that an actual disruption took place. Since 
administrators believed his comments would likely interfere with the 
operations of the university, their actions were protected. 
In sum, the findings indicate that courts were more likely to rule in 
favor of professors in the time frame between Pickering and Connick. 
Professors won 15 cases during that era, compared to six from 1983 to 1996. 
Reasons for the differences are unclear, although it appears that courts before 
Connick generally put a higher value on the individual's right to speak than 
on the institutional interests. Moreover, courts in the early days seemed to be 
more tolerant of a professor's criticism or complaining. That philosophy 
appeared to shift under Connick's public concern test. 
ISSUE 4: HOW HA VE THE COURTS EXAMINED, THE DIFFERENT 
CLASSIFICATIONS OF PROFESSORIAL SPEECH? 
FINDING 4: COURTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO PROTECT OUT-OF-CLASS 
SPEECH BY THE PROFESSOR RATHER THAN CLASSROOM SPEECH OR 
ACADEMIC BICKERING. 
The professorial speech of each case was divided into one of three categories: 
classroom speech, speech uttered outside the classroom and academic bickering. 
The findings indicated that out-of-class speech is the most protected; however, 
classroom speech received less protection than either out-of-class expression or 
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academic bickering. Table IV illustrates this. 
TABLE IV 
THE PROFESSORS' WIN-LOSS PERCENTAGE BY TYPE OF SPEECH 
N=99 
Outcome Percentage 
Type of Speech Win Loss Remand Total 
Classroom 13% 68% 19% 100% 
Out-of-Class 31% 40% 29% 100% 
Bickering 14% 74% 12% 100% 
Speech Outside The Classroom 
Out-of-class speech, the most diverse group, in the three-tier 
classification is when a professor is ·speaking or writing to someone outside 
the classroom. Sometimes, the audience is colleagues or administrators in 
the department or on campus, but, in most cases, however, the audience is 
some individual or group located off-campus. 
The findings show that courts safeguaded out-of-class speech more 
than the other two other categories. Of the 48 cases in this category, professors 
won 15 (31 percent), lost 19 (40 percent) and 14 (29 percent) were remanded. 
For purposes of discussion, the cases have been divided into four general 
types of cases: (1) Comments to media, legislature or letters to someone 
outside the university; (2) Demonstrations or faculty activity in local politics; 
(3) Public comments aimed at someone off-campus; and (4) comments to 
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someone on-campus. 
Comments To Media, State Agency, Organizations Outside The University 
The most protected out-of-class speech was comments to newspapers, 
radio stations, legislative committees or other organizations outside the 
university. Of the 10 cases falling in this category, professors prevailed nine 
times. 
In McCann (1995), a director of the Seismic Network for the university 
(and also an assistant professor of geology), appeared on a radio program and 
questioned the location of a coal-induced power plant to be located in 
Mayaguez. The court found that the speech was indeed protected and further 
concluded that McCann's interests clearly outweighed the State's interests. 
Similar protection was afforded professors in similar type situations. 
The cases involving communications to a 'state agency or the 
legislature are best illustrated by D' Andrea v. Adams (1980). A tenured 
professor traveled to the State Capitol in Montgomery, Alabama and told state 
officials that his university, Troy State University, improperly used funds. 
The court found that such comments are protected and did not present a 
"substantial risk of weakening and undermining the state legislator's support 
for the university" (p. 476). A 1992 decision in Wisconsin reached the same 
result, emphasizing that school funding is a matter of public concern and 
teachers are uniquely qualified to discuss such funding. 
One unclear issue, however, was letters to an accreditation agency. In 
Johnson v. Lincoln University (1985), a professor wrote a letter to an 
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accreditation agency concerning the low academic standards of his university. 
The court found that questions of academic standards19, as was the subject of 
the letter, were public concern.20 But in Harris v. Mississippi Valley State 
University (1995), a professor's letter to an accreditation agency was not of 
public concern. The reason is that the letter simply informed the agency, 
pursuant to university policy, about the hiring of another professor. It did 
not, the court concluded, complain about university misconduct or otherwise 
communicate an issue of public concern. 
Another murky question in out-of-class cases was the filing of a formal 
grievance or lawsuit. In Grace, a state court lawsuit that complained about 
the way the university had procedurally handled teaching assignments, 
leaves of absences and merit raises was not considered to be of public concern. 
The professors, the court wrote, "presented no evidence that their primary 
motivation was to aid other faculty members or draw attention to matters 
beyond their own personal interests" (p. 393). 
In San Filippo v. Bongiovanni (1994), a professor who had frequently 
been in disputes with administrators, filed a grievance that h.e had been 
denied promotion through manipulation of his promotion packet. While 
the grievance was pending, the department recommended he be denied 
tenure. The court did not analyze the grievance under the freedom of speech 
19 A definition of academic standards was not provided by the court. 
20 The case was remanded so the trial court could apply the Pickering balancing test. 
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but instead examined the First Amendment petition clause.21 It remanded the 
case, but noted that a professor's "petition" (i.e., grievance or lawsuit) may 
enjoy more First Amendment protection than his speech. 
Political Activity 
The second group of cases involved professors who participated in 
boycotts, demonstrations or other political activity. Typically, these cases took 
place during the 1970s as faculty and students alike protested the United 
States' involvement in Vietnam. Participation in demonstrations or boycotts 
was generally protected, unless a professor was shown to be an agitator or a 
significant disruption to university operations. Professors also lost these type 
of cases when the speech was not a factor in the dismissal. 
Comments Generally Aimed At The Public 
The third category of out-of-class cases focused on public comments 
aimed at someone outside the university. Illustrative of this was Peacock v. 
Duval (1982). Peacock, the head of the department of surgery, vigorously 
opposed changed in systems for allocating funds received for professional 
services and publicly criticized administrators about the way medical 
education should be funded at a public institution. He subsequently was 
asked to resign. 
The trial court found for the university, but the appellate court 
remanded the case, holding that at least some of the speech was protected 
21 The First Amendment reads, in part:" Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press, or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances." 
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because it concerned questions of policies relating to public medical schools. 
''Merely because Peacock's speech may have irritated or even harassed the 
university administration does not mean that such speech is stripped of its 
First Amendment protection," (p. 647) the court explained. 
On-Campus Speech 
A fourth group of cases involved communication from a professor to 
someone on-campus. In Stern v. Shouldice (1983), Stern advised a student to 
hire an attorney. The student had been suspended by the university for being 
arrested for marijuana possession by Canadian police. The court found that 
the advice did not effect his teaching or cause problems with faculty and, 
therefore, was protected. Conversely, a basketball coach who used the word 
"nigger'' (which was deemed by the court to not be a matter of public concern) 
in a closed-door locker room session lost his case. 
In sum, the cases suggested that, if the speech was aimed at someone 
off-campus, courts would grant First Amendment protection. H the professor 
made his comments public, often times that speech would be protected. 
However, if the professor simply spoke or wrote to another individual with 
no intent of making the speech public, protection was not forthcoming. 
Another significant factor was the courts' interpretation of a "matter of 
public concern." The ends of the spectrum seemed clear. A purely personal 
complaint by the professor I employee was not public concern and thus not 
protected. However, public comments by the professor to the media on a 
funding issue was usually considered to be of public concern. The more 
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difficult issues were somewhere in between. 
As a general rule, it appeared that the speech would more likely be of 
public concern if at least part of the audience was off-campus and the subject 
dealt with something other than a professor's own personal dilemmas. One 
example was Jeffries' off-campus speech on black oppression. Another was 
Levin's article in a scholarly journal. In Maples, the court found a critical 
report of the professors' department (which was distributed to some persons 
outside the university) was of public concern. Speech aimed at someone on-
campus, particularly a department head or colleague, and that involved 
departmental issues was usually not considered to be of public concern. 
Cases Involving In-Class Speech 
The findings clearly showed that a professor's classroom speech has rarely 
been protected by courts. Of the 16 cases, professors prevailed only twice and lost 10 
times. Three of the cases were remanded. 
The most recent victory came in Silva v. University of New Hampshire 
(1994). Dr. Donald Silva, a tenured professor, taught a technical writing class where 
he compared the subject to sexual relationships, described ''belly dancing'' as like 
Jell-0 on a plate with a vibrator underneath and made other comments believed to 
be sexually harassing by students and some administrators. 
The court, however, did not agree with university officials. In a two-part 
analysis, the court first found that the university's sexual harassment policy violated 
Silva's First Amendment rights because it did not take into account the professor's 
academic freedom interests. The court then proceeded to analyze the claim under 
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the Connick standard and found that the speech uttered by Silva was a matter of 
public concern. Silva's comments, the court emphasized, were made for the 
legitimate pedagogical, public purpose of conveying certain principles related to the 
subject matter of his course. In addition, the court found that the content, form and 
contest of his statements were directly related to "the preservation of academic 
freedom" and whether speech "offensive" to a particular class of individuals 
should be tolerated in American schools. Consequently, the court concluded that 
Silva's free speech interests were "overwhelmingly superior'' to the university's 
interest in proscribing the speech. 
The other win by a professor came in 1979 in Cooper v. Ross. Cooper, a non-
tenured history professor told his World and American Civilization classes that he 
was Communist, a member of the Progressive Labor Party and taught from a 
Marxist point-of-view. A student newspaper later published an article about 
Cooper's classroom comments, prompting considerable newspaper and television 
coverage. In addition, 23 state legislators filed a lawsuit against Cooper and the 
University, requesting he be enjoined from further employment.22 The university 
later notified Cooper that he would not be given tenure. 
The court, however, found that Cooper's announcement to his class was 
constitutionally protected. Citing Tinker, it noted· that the "Supreme Court made 
clear that some in-class protection of political beliefs by teachers and students alike is 
protected." The court further reasoned that Cooper's comments did not "materially" 
22 At that time, Ark.Stat.Ann. 41-4113(c) stated: "No person who is a member of a Nazi, Fascist or Communist 
society, or any organization affiliated with such socities, shall be eligible for employment by the State of 
Arkansas, or by any department, agency, institution, or municipality thereof." 
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or "substantially disrupt" classes and caused little concern until the incident was 
publicized by the media. 
It appears that Silva and Cooper prevailed, to some extent, because their 
comments were deemed to have a nexus to the subject matter. The same was true 
for the other two cases remanded -- Dube v. State University of New York (1990) and 
Mahoney v. Hankin (1984). 
In-Class Speech Cases Remanded 
Dube taught a Politics of Race class that included material on Nazism, 
Apartheid and Zionism. He was accused, however, of teaching his own personal 
ideology (i.e:, that Zionism is as racist as Nazism). The university subsequently 
denied tenure to Professor Dube. The appellate court, however, noted that academic 
freedom protected his comments in the classroom, but sent the case back to the trial 
court because it was unclear as to whether the denial of tenure was related to the 
speech. Mahoney taught a political science court where he discussed some of the 
university's controversial issues. The court found such comments to be related to 
political science and protected but proceeded to trial to determine whether the 
speech significantly impeded university operations. In nearly every case in this 
area, the key question was whether the speech was relevant to the subject matter of 
the class. 
Cases Where University Prevailed 
One case, however, illustrated the "gray area" in determining whether speech 
is relevant to the subject matter. In Bishop v. Aronov (1991), a human physiology 
teacher, was reprimanded after he referred to his religious beliefs during class and in 
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after-class meetings. The court focused not on the relevance of the speech to the 
class but on the proposition that a university has the authority to reasonably control 
curriculum content. Wrote the court: ''His [professor Bishop] educational judgment 
can be questioned and redirected by the University when he is acting under its 
auspices as a course instructor, but not when he acts as an independent educator or 
researcher. The University's conclusions about course content must be allowed to 
hold sway over an individual professor's judgments" (p. 1076). Another case, 
Lovelace (1986), also concluded that course content, homework load and grading 
policies are university core concerns. 
The cases also indicated that, even where a professor's speech is 
relevant to the class's subject matter, the university may still prevail. For 
· example, in Cohen v. San Bernadina. Valley College (1995), a remedial 
English professor discussed cannibalism, consensual sex with children and 
other vulgaries in the classroom. The court found the comm en ts to be of 
public concern, but decided that the State's interests in educating its students 
outweighed Cohen's interest in focusing on sexual topics in the classroom. 
Scallet v. Rosenblum (1996) had similar reasoning. Also, if the court found 
that the reason for the discipline or termination was for some legitimate 
reason other than the speech, the university prevailed. 
Academic Bickering 
Academic bickering is speech that usually arises because of a professor 
is unhappy about working conditions (i.e., salary, personnel decisions, 
management decisions). The findings showed this speech to be the most 
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litigated. 
Of the 35 cases in this group, professors won five, universities 
prevailed 26 times and there were four remands. Perhaps the easiest finding 
in the study was that speech uttered as a part of a professor's personal 
grievance will not be protected. 
In Dodds v. Childers (1991), a community college instructor who 
repeatedly complained about the president's sister-in-law did not have her 
contract renewed. The court found that Dodds' primary concern was the 
effect of the president's sister-in-law on her own employment, not its 
potential impact on the public interest. The court also held the issue was not 
a matter of public concern: ''We have previously found that complaints 
might rise above the purely personal level, but are instead expressed only as 
issues of employee favoritism, are personal grievances rather than issues of 
public concern" (p. 274). 
In Mahaffey (1983), a tenured professor proposed the parks and 
recreation management program be accredited separately from the 
Department of Forestry. In addition, he publicized a student paper in his 
classes that unflatteringly portrayed certain administrative decisions taken 
within the department. He also complained about his salary. Mahaffey's 
teaching load was then reduced to a nine months and a written reprimand 
put in his personnel file. 
The court found that Mahaffey's speech (i.e., concerns about salary, 
management problems as they related to him) were "quintessentially items of 
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individual, rather than public, concern." An individual cannot ''bootstrap his 
individual grievances into a matter of public concern by bruiting his 
complaint to the world," (p. 890) the court wrote. 
Examples of Bickering Speech Not Protected 
Dodds and Mahaffey illustrated the general consensus of the courts. 
General complaints about working conditions or personnel matters raised by 
a professor having problems with a department chair and/ or other 
administrators simply were not deemed to be of public concern. 
Consequently, speech concerning salaries, petty disputes with administrators, 
disputes over personnel decisions, criticism over how a department chair is 
selected and in-fighting among colleagues typically will not be protected. 
Courts were consistent on this point: Howze v. Virginia Polytechnic 
(1995)(vocally alleged she was discriminated against), Harris v. Mississippi 
Valley State (1995)(letter to accreditation boc;trd), Harris v. Merwin 
(1995)(complaints about the hiring of a department head), Dambrot v. Central 
Michigan University (1993)(used the word "nigger" when speaking to his 
basketball players), Hartman v. Board of Trustees (1993)(refused to follow 
instructions she deemed improper) Grace v. Board of Trustees 
(1992)(complaints about employment of the president's sister-in-law), Keen v. 
Penson (1992)(letter written to student demanding apology) and Ayoub v. 
Texas A&M (1991)(upset over salary increase). Moreover, the courts agreed 
that the First Amendment did not protect speech and conduct amounting to 
insubordination aimed at school officials (Hillis, 1982). 
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Some exceptions to the above rule emerged, although the cases took 
place prior to the Connick decision. In Lindsey v. Board of Regents (1979), a 
group of professors distributed a questionnaire to all faculty members' mail 
boxes in the College of Education. The university investigated, attempting to 
determine if university supplies or facilities had been improperly used and 
later decided not to renew Lindsey's contract. 
The court found that the questionnaire solicited views on a ''broad 
range of issues" involving teaching, administrative-faculty relationships and 
consequently was protected under the First Amendment. The questionnaire, 
reasoned the court, was "neither a mere in-house dialogue about 
administrative details nor an indication of the adequacy of teaching 
performance of Lindsey'' (p. 675). This decision, however, is limited to some 
extent because it was decided prior to the Connick decision. 
Similar facts took place in Honore v. Douglas (1987). Honore had been 
denied tenure by the dean after he had been "active" and "vocal" in law 
school affairs. He had protested actions by the dean, signed grievance letters 
and had expressed a lack of confidence in the dean. Among the controversial 
issues were the law school admissions policy, the size of the student 
population, administration of the budget and failure to certify graduates for 
the Texas bar examination in a timely fashion. 
The court found that such issues were of public concern and thus 
protected free speech. The case, however, was remanded to determine if the 
tenure denial took place for a reason other than the speech. 
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Perhaps the most bizarre circumstance occurred in this category. In 
Luxemberg v. Texas A&M University, a director accused Luxemberg, a Jewish 
immigrant from Russia, as being a KGB agent. He made the allegations to the 
FBI, who investigated and could not substantiate the charges. About the same 
time, Luxemberg had accused the director of fraudulently overstating 
equipment costs. Subsequently, Luxemberg's salary was reduced and he sued. 
The court concluded that Luxemberg' s accusation was protected by the First 
Amendment, but found that the professor was disciplined for not doing his 
job. 
In sum, the decisions drew a line (although not a clear one) between 
personal grievances (e.g., salaries, teaching assignments, personality disputes) 
and complaints about legitimate issues that touched on the academic 
performance of a department or university. Another factor that played a role 
was whether the professor had been in a long-running dispute with 
supervisors or colleagues. 
ISSUE 5: DO FEDERAL COURTS USE THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM WHEN DECIDING PROFESSORIAL SPEECH DISPUTES? WHAT 
IMPACT DOES THE CONCEPT HA VE IN FREE SPEECH QUESTIONS? 
FINDING 5: ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS NOT A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN 
MOST PROFESSORIAL SPEECH CASES 
About one in every three cases decided discussed academic freedom, but it 
rarely made a difference in the outcome. Of the 99 cases, 30 courts discussed the 
academic freedom issue. Of those, however, professors only won six and lost 18. Six 
were remanded. Sixty-nine of the decisions did not mention academic freedom. 
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TABLE V 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM CASES BY OUTCOME 
Outcome 
Academic Freedom Win Loss Remand 
AF Mentioned 2 16 3 
AF Factor in Decision 4 2 3 
AF Not Mentioned 16 38 15 
Grand Total 22 56 21 
The decisions discussing academic freedom, typically a factor only in 
classroom speech cases, can be divided into four groups: (1) cases where the courts 
appeared to have found that academic freedom was an independent First 
Amendment right; (2) cases where the court took into consideration the professor's 
academic freedom as a part of the Pickering balancing test; (3) cases where the court 
found that the university's academic freedom outweighed the individual professor's 
academic freedom; and (4) courts that simply said it was unclear as to the 
constitutional weight of academic freedom. 
Academic Freedom As Independent First Amendment Right. 
The group of cases giving a professor's academic freedom significant weight 
generally required that the speech at issue was (1) germane to the subject matter and 
(2) served an educational function. (Martin v. Parrish (1986). For example, in Silva 
v. University of New Hampshire (1994), found that the University of New 
Hampshire's sexual harassment policy was overreaching because it employed an 
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"impermissibly subjective standard that fails to take into account the nation's 
interest in academic freedom" (p. 23). The university ruled that Silva had violated 
the harassment policy after he had made in-class comments in his technical writing 
course deemed "outrageous" and sexist by six female students.23 But the court 
concluded that Silva's comments related to his technical writing course and had an 
educational function, emphasizing that the classroom is "peculiarly the marketplace 
of ideas" and noted that "teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, 
to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding ... otherwise our 
civilization will stagnate and.die" (p.21). 
Academic Freedom Part of Pickering Balancing Test 
Scallet (1996) is an example of the second category of reasoning by courts. 
There, the court noted that the Pickering test does not "explicitly account for the 
robust tradition of academic freedom:'' To remedy that, the court considered a 
professor's academic freedom rights as a part of the Pickering balancing process and 
found Scallet's comments on diversity in a business course to be protected speech. 
As noted, however, Scallet lost the case. 
Institutional Academic Freedom More Important 
The third group of cases pitted institutional automony against the free speech 
rights of the professor. In Lovelace (1986), a professor said his contract was not 
renewed because he refused to lower his academic standards. The court ruled that 
matters such as course content, homework load, and grading policy are core 
23 The university also accused Silva of making other "sexist" and unprofessional comments to students outside 
the classroom. 
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university concerns. Another court, Bishop (1991), phrased it as follows: 
We do not find support to conclude that academic freedom is an 
independent First Amendment right. And, in any event, we 
cannot supplant our discretion for that of the University. 
Federal judges should not be ersatz deans or educators. In this 
regard, we trust that the University will serve its own interests 
as well as those of its professors in pursuit of academic freedom. 
University officials are undoubtedly aware that qualify faculty 
members will be hard to attract and retain if they are to be 
shackled in much of what they do (Bishop .L1991, p.1075).24 
Academic Freedom Unclear 
The last line of reasoning concerning academic freedom is best illustrated in 
Hillis (1982). There, an art professor claimed his contract had not been renewed 
because he refused to give a "B" to a student as his supervisor instructed. While 
Hillis said such administrative conduct violated his academic freedom, the court 
disagreed. Along the way, it discussed the uncertain legal relevance of academic 
freedom: ''While academic freedom is well recognized, its perimeters are ill-defined 
and the case law defining it is inconsistent"(p. 553). 
In dosing, the legal weight of academic freedom can be summed up simply: of 
99 cases, six decisions mentioning academic freedom assisted the professor. Sixty-
nine of the cases did not discuss academic freedom. Of those that did, only a 
24 Several cases emphasized that "academic freedom is not a license for uncontrolled expression at variance with 
established curricular contents and internally destructive of the proper function of the university." .cl.!!rkY... 
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handful considered the concept to be an "independent" First Amendment right; the. 
rest simply considered it as a part of the overall equation. 
ISSUE 6: DO FEDERAL COURTS OFFER MORE FIRST AMENDMENT FREE 
SPEECH PROTECTION TO TENURED PROFESSORS THAN THEY DO TO 
NON-TENURED ONES? 
FINDING 6: NON-TENURED PROFESSORS FARED BETTER THAN 
TENURED FACULTY MEMBERS 
Non-tenured faculty member fared slightly better in free speech litigation 
than did the tenured professors. Of the 99 cases, 67 of the plaintiffs were non-
tenured professors, either instructors on an annual contract or faculty members who 
were denied tenure. Of the 67, they won 17 (25 percent), lost 38 (57 percent) and 12 
(18 percent) were remanded. Tenured professors, on the other hand, won five (16 
percent), lost 18 (56 percent and nine (28 percent) were remanded. 
TABLE IV 
OUTCOME OF DECISIONS BY TENURE STATUS OF PROFESSOR 
Outcome 
Tenure Status Win Loss Remand 
Tenured 5 18 9 
Not Tenured 17 38 12 
TOTAL 21 56 21 
For the most part, the courts were inconsistent in how they treated the issue 
of tenure. In some cases, the courts would appear to go out of their way to describe 
Holmes (1972). 
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the professor as "non-tenured" but failed to explain whether such status was 
important to the decision. In yet another line of cases, the courts would note that a 
non-tenured professor would have the burden of proof in a free speech case while a 
university would have the burden in a case involving a tenured professor. (Johnson 
v. Cain , 1977). A third category of cases would simply indicate that tenure played no 
part in the court's analysis (Mabey v. Reagan ,1976). 
Many courts, however, did not want to second-guess universities' decisions 
on tenure unless a First Amendment violation had occurred. For example, in 
Keddie , the court wrote: 
This court is powerless to substitute its judgment for that of the 
University as to whether's Plaintiff's academic credentials are 
such that tenure should be awarded. The judiciary is not 
qualified to evaluate academic performance. The courts do not 
posses the expert knowledge or have the academic experience 
which should enlighten an academic committee's decision. The 
courts will not serve as~ Super-Tenure Review Committee (p. 
1270). 
In sum, the findings suggested that tenure carries no obvious weight in the. 
court's decisions and, in fact, non-tenured professors had a slight advantage in the 




The analysis indicated the following. First, the numbers show that litigation 
over professorial speech issues increased in the 1990s as compared to previous years. 
The statistics also suggest that the number of published federal court decisions this 
decade will double the amounts in 1980. 
Second, although the United States Supreme Court has not specifically dealt 
with the professorial speech issue, the courts are generally consistent in applying the 
Three-Prong test to out-of-class .and academic bickering cases. The same cannot be 
said for classroom speech cases. The findings indicate that courts are still grappling 
with what rules (and how to apply them) in these type of c.ases. 
Third, professors won only one of every five free speech cases from 1968 to 
1996 and the study suggests the outcome for the future does not look any better. 
The most prosperous time frame for professors seeking free speech protection was 
from 1977 to 1982; the worst era was from 1983 to 1988. 
Fourth, federal courts found the First Amendment protects a professor's out-
of-class speech in comparison to speech uttered in the classroom and academic 
bickering disputes. Courts generally protected professorial speech when it was aimed 
at someone off-campus such as the media or another state agency. Speech was rarely 
protected if it involved a personal grievance or petty complaint. 
Fifth, academic freedom carried little legal weight in the courts' analysis of 
professorial speech claims. A few courts viewed academic freedom as an 
"independent'' First Amendment right but most failed to even mention the concept 
in their decision. 
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Sixth, the findings showed the non-tenured professors had a better winning 
percentage than tenured ones. This number suggests that courts give no 
preferential treatment to tenured professors seeking protection for their First 
Amendment free speech rights. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The overriding problem undertaken in this study was to determine, 
within limitations, the constitutional boundaries of a professor's First 
Amendment freedom of speech rights in three different arenas: in the 
classroom, outside the classroom and academic bickering. This information 
is valuable to faculty members and administrators alike because it alerts them 
to the growing dilemma and offers a better understanding of their respective 
legal positions. 
The data used for ,the analysis were 99 federal court decisions published 
between 1968 and 1996. The decisions were found by searching the Westlaw 
legal database, the Federal Digest and secondary sources such as law journal 
articles and treatises. Each of the decisions selected included a First 
Amendment free speech claim by a professor. 
Issues addressed in the study were: Are more free speech disputes 
taking place in federal courts today than in the past? Have the federal courts 
consistently applied United States Supreme Court precedents to the three 
types of professorial speech? Are professors more likely to lose free speech 
disputes today than in the past. How have the courts examined the different 
classifications of professorial speech i.e., classroom, out-of-class, academic 
bickering, in the past 28 years? Do federal courts use the concept of academic 
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freedom when deciding professorial speech disputes? Do federal courts offer 
more First Amendment free speech protection to tenured professors than 
they do to non-tenured ones? 
The federal court decisions were individually briefed using a case 
method analysis. The information was then summarized and coded into six 
categories: (1) outcome, (2) type of speech, (3) time frame, (4) tenure status of 
professors, (5) precedent applied, (6) whether academic freedom was 
mentioned. At that point, the results were cross-tabulated and examined. No 
statistical analysis was used. 
The study's findings can be summarized as follows: First, the numbers 
show that litigation over professorial speech issues increased in the 1990s as 
compared to previous years. Second, although the United States Supreme 
Court has not specifically dealt with the professorial speech issue, the courts 
are generally consistent in applying the same precedents to out-of-class and 
academic bickering cases. The same cannot be said for classroom speech cases. 
Third, professors are more likely to lose First Amendment free speech 
lawsuits, and it appears their constitutional protection for freedom of speech 
is declining. Fourth, federal courts are more likely to find the First 
Amendment protects a professor's out-of-class speech in comparison to 
speech uttered in the classroom and academic bickering disputes. Fifth, courts 
seldom rely on the concept of academic freedom when deciding a free speech 
claim. Sixth, tenured professors fare about the same as their nontenured 
counterparts in free speech disputes. 
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Conclusions 
Three major conclusions emerge from this study. First, it provides a 
general road map on the professorial speech issue for faculty and 
administrators alike. Second, the findings in the study paint a bleak picture 
for professors, but the numbers do not and cannot begin to tell the whole 
story. Third, despite the overwhelmingly positive numbers for 
administrators, the news can not be viewed as all good. 
The Free Speech Road Map 
The First Amendment road map gleaned from this study, while not 
precise, clearly shows many of the legal contours and dangerous territory in 
the three speech arenas. 
The following parameters emerge for professors' out-of-class speech. ff 
the professor, in a place and context apart from her role as faculty member, 
speaks or writes off-campus as a private citizen on a clearly public issue, 
courts will likely determine the speech is protected under the First 
Amendment. But the closer the speech is, or is linked to, a campus issue 
and/or the faculty member's on-campus duties, the more likely protection 
will be denied. 
The boundaries for academic bickering speech appear to be as follows. 
The closer the "speech" relates to an issue solely involving the professor the 
more likely courts will deny constitutional protection. A common example is 
a salary dispute but any complaint that is perceived as petty bickering 
(especially within an academic department) generally will be viewed with 
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disdain by federal courts. A legitimate dispute over a broad academic issue 
sometimes is the exception. 
The First Amendment contours· of classroom speech are more difficult 
to define, but the study suggests that two factors contribute to the professor's 
chances of prevailing. First, the professorial speech must have a nexus to 
the subject matter. Second, the speech must be within the general parameters 
of the university curriculum. If either or both of those factors are absent, the 
university probably will prevail. And the chances for constitutional 
protection narrows the further removed the speech is from the subject matter 
of the course. 
The study further. supported a three-tier classification as a logical way 
to examine professorial speech. The idea behind the classification is to 
separate the speech in accord with how much First Amendment free speech 
protection is likely. This would aid educators in analyzing their respective 
problems. For example, as the literature and study shows, out-of-class speech 
receives more protection than the other two categories. Thus, the 
academician has an idea that, if the speech can be classified as out-of-class, it 
has a better chance of being protected. 
One problem in this study, however, is that the definitions proved to 
be too general. Out-of-class speech was simply defined as speech taking place 
outside the classroom and therefore leaves a blurry line between what is out-
of-class expression and what is academic bickering. A more expansive 
definition would dassify out-of-class speech as "expression outside the 
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classroom by a faculty member acting primarily in her role as "concerned" 
citizen or "concerned" faculty member. " This definition would make the 
category more selective and, as a result, the professor's winning percentage 
would increase. The term "academic bickering" also is confusing as it 
suggests that the bickering relates to an academic issue. Perhaps the category 
could be renamed "personal bickering'' or "individual bickering." Along the 
same lines, professors would fare better in classroom speech cases if they were 
defined as "expression in the classroom relating to the subject matter." 
Conversely, the cases that met neither the definition of out-of-class nor in-
class would fall to what is considered the least protected category: academic 
bickering. 
The Professor's Gloomy Outlook: Some Possible Explanations 
The findings clearly suggest that courts, contrary to the language of the 
First Amendment and academic freedom rhetoric, provide limited 
constitutional protection for professorial speech. Professors have won only 22 
of the 99 cases since 1968 and the picture seems to get worse in modern times. 
Therefore, this study concludes much the same way as Zirkel's: "the results 
are sobering for the faculty member ... who might drink too deeply of the bottle 
labeled 'academic freedom' [or First Amendment] as an euphoric cure for 
various problems with colleagues, administrators and external governmental 
agencies." 
The simple lesson is obvious: once they are in a federal court, 
professors expecting constitutional protection for their speech are treading on 
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a dangerous and slippery slope. Despite a professor's integral role in society, 
courts do not seem sympathetic. With a few exceptions, they lump professors 
with police officers, nurses, public school teachers, secretaries, maintenance 
workers and all other "public employee" in free speech analysis. That should 
send a strong signal to the professoriate. 
Another conclusion, supported by the literature, is the university 
power base is shifting. Once viewed as a faculty-centered institution, it 
appears to be more student-centered in the 1990s. That also has increased the 
power of administrators, who say they act on behalf of the students. 
The numbers in this study, however, should be viewed with caution 
and in the overall context. First, the federal court decisions do not tell the 
whole story and must only be viewed as a slice of the "big picture." Many 
faculty members and universities never set forth in a courtroom on a free 
speech question. This may be, in part, because some universities promote a 
"free speech" environment where faculty members and administrators alike 
recognize the need for an uninhibited marketplace. In addition, when a 
professor's contract includes the language from the AAUP Statement, it helps 
insulate the faculty member from this problem. Obviously, these type of 
situations -- which usually do not appear in the literature or in the text of a 
court decision - are positive signs for professorial free speech and should not 
be overlooked. 
Another factor that may explain some of the dismal results is a closer 
look at the circumstances surrounding the case. Not all professorial 
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accusations of a free speech violation are legitimate or "quality" claims. For 
example, a professor may lose her job for incompetence or some other 
legitimate reason. The professor may then sue on other grounds (e.g., 
procedural due process) and toss in an unsubstantiated or flimsy First 
Amendment claim after the fact. The court therefore may fail to take the 
claim seriously. 
In addition, a professor's First Amendment claim appears, at least 
implicitly, to be influenced by his or her past behavior. Courts seem less 
enthused with the "malcontent" or habitual "troublemaker" -- a professor 
engaged in a long-running feud with administrators and/ or colleagues on a 
variety of issues. This observation does not advocate banning the free speech 
rights of those types, but such facts (which were not a variable in this study) 
may very well taint the court and slant some of the numbers in this study. 
Conversely, however, professors boasting an unblemished history (e.g., good 
teacher, able colleague) seemed more likely to prevail. 
A third factor deserving a closer look is the number of remands. 
Approximately one of every five were remanded. In most -- but not all - of 
the decisions, the remand gave the professor a "second bite of the apple." 
Typically, the court had either decided more evidence was needed to decide 
the claim or that a court had improperly analyzed the professor's First 
Amendment claim. While these cases cannot be counted as victories for the 
faculty member, they must be taken into account. 
Finally, the study did not provide enough information to draw a 
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detailed conclusion about tenured professors. The cases examined suggested 
that non-tenured and tenured professors are treated in similar fashion, but a 
closer look needs to be taken. According to the literature, tenure has been 
considered the "chief device" for protection of professorial freedom. 
A Look From The Administrative Viewpoint 
The viewpoint from the university administrator is, at best, described 
as both "good news" and "bad news." The numbers, while not analyzed 
statistically, overwhelmingly favor the university. Since 1983, this study 
shows that professors only won six times in 50 attempts. The university won 
33 of those and 11 were remanded. The statistics in classroom speech disputes 
were even more lopsided. 
The good news is that courts seem to champion institutional 
autonomy, especially when it is pitted against an individual professor's First 
Amendment free speech rights. Many courts at least mentioned the fact that 
they were not (and did not want to be) in the business of running the 
university and, as a result, should, whenever possible, defer to the 
university's decision-making process. ''Federal judges should not be ersatz 
deans or educators," (p. 1075) wrote the court in Bishop (1991). ''The 
administration of the university rests not with the courts, but with the 
administrators of the institution," (p. 827) stated the judge in Parate (1989). 
What "bad news" can come from this? Historically, the idea of a 
university has been an educational Mecca -- a sacrosanct destination for 
students and teachers seeking knowledge and searching for truth. 
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Suppressing speech or frequently disciplining faculty members does not mesh 
well with that philosophy. "[T]eachers and students must always remain free 
to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding ... otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die," the United 
States Supreme Court wrote in 1966. Simply put, the free speech issue should 
not be staged as a legal tug-of-war between warring professors and 
institutions. It should be seen as a cancerous threat to the health and well-
being of the university's role in society. 
A further concern for universities is the fact that the role of a third-
party (i.e., the courts) increasingly expands every time a free speech or any 
other kind of dispute spills over to federal court.25 Additional litigation only 
gives the courts more influence on how a public university should be run 
and this is certainly not a positive factor. In addition, universities, if courts 
begin questioning their practices more frequently, may find their autonomy 
. being diminished at the expense of outside interference. Therefore, working 
on in-house solutions to the free speech issue or any other significant 
problem should be diligently pursued. 
Recommendations/Implications For Further Study 
If anything can be gleaned from this study, it is the fact that no elixir 
exists to solve the professorial speech problem. Ever since Socrates was put to 
25 Even courts themselves point this out In Trotmann v. Board of Trustees of Lincoln Unjversjty (1980), the 
court's opening paragraph read: "It is unfortunate that resort to the courts has been deemed neccesary ... when the 
controversy arises out of deep divisions in the academic community, as does this one, the judcial process seems 
inept The academic process entails, at its core, open communications leading to reasoned decisions. Our society 
assumes, in almost all cases with good reason, that different views within the academic community will be tested 
121 
death for corrupting the youth of Athens, the issue of autonomy for the 
educator has remained a dilemma. 
At least two recommendations, however, are offered. The first is an 
on-going educational program. In Chapter 1, Emerson noted that thefull 
benefits of the [legal] system can be realized only when the individual knows 
the extent of his rights and has some assurance of protection in exercising 
them. Chafee wrote that it is increasingly important to determine the true 
limits of freedom of expression so that speakers and writers may know how 
much they can properly say, and government may be sure how much they 
can lawfully and wisefully suppress. 
This most certainly applies to the free speech problem. Like walking 
around in a dark room, most professors and administrators dealing with the 
free speech issue stumble around with no specific knowledge of the laws 
concerning freedom of speech. They have little idea as to the "extent" of their 
rights or what "assurance of protection" they have. Then, when faced with a 
conflict, some, if not many, professors invoke "academic freedom" as some 
sort of super-protective cloak.· Some administrators, on the other hand, seem 
to think they can discipline a professor simply in the name of protecting 
student rights. Both viewpoints are misplaced. 
Consequently, the first recommendation is for a more in-depth 
education program for academicians. Both the AAUP or the individual 
institutions should make an effort to better explain the legal ramifications 
involved in professorial speech issues before a dispute erupts. Armed with 
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sufficient knowledge, professors and administrators will have a better 
understanding of their respective positions and, as a result, less conflict will 
surface. This education program could be set up as a part of a professional 
development series or perhaps added as a component to graduate studies. In 
any regard, educating the various parties about the law should be a priority. 
A second recommendation is for the universities (perhaps with the 
assistance of the AAUP) to set up an alternative dispute resolution procedure 
especially designed for free speech questions. The literature clearly shows that 
a courtroom battle between professor and institution is seldom a positive 
experience. Taxpayer money is wasted. Unfavorable publicity takes place. As 
discussed, the courts take a more significant role in overseeing the university. 
Suggesting what appears to be yet another bureaucratic procedure for an 
academic program may seem comical, but resolving the issue in-house 
should be a priority. Perhaps a university could appoint a "free speech" 
ombudsman who would investigate~ hear the evidence and render a ruling. 
While the debate may still end up in court, a program -- if perceived as 
objective - will most certainly reduce the litigation. 
Finally, this study offers several ideas for future research. A more 
precise look needs to be taken at the three classifications in this study 
(classroom speech, out-of-class speech and academic bickering). Is there a 
better way to define them? Is there a more logical classification? 
The findings here also suggest that courts lump professorial speech 
analysis in the same boat as all other types of public employees. 
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Consequently, a study comparing the rights of other public employees with 
professors would be helpful as well as a comparison between the First 
Amendment free speech rights of public school teachers and professors. 
Third, this study focused on publicly employed faculty members. What 
problems, if any, exist in the private institutions of higher education? As a 
general rule, since there is no "state actor," the First Amendment freedom of 
speech clause will not apply. Therefore, the issue of academic freedom and 
contract law become increasingly important. 
Fourth, a look at the development of cases at the circuit court level 
would be interesting. In this study, more than one-third of the decisions took 
place in the Fifth Circuit, which raises the question of why. Taking a closer 
look at the circuit decisions also may help elaborate on the precedents used in 
the various circuits. 
Lastly, the next logical study is one dealing with the First Amendment 
free speech rights of the professor on the Internet. At the time of this writing, 
Internet is quickly becoming a fixture at colleges and universities worldwide. 
While legal experts are unsure exactly how courts will deal with these 
cyberlaw issues, it is likely that the precedents will come, in part, from past 
professorial speech cases. 
Perhaps the most important lesson from this study is that the free 
speech rights of professors are fluid. The boundaries of protected speech in 
1968 changed by 1977. And the 1977 parameters differed from those of 1983 
and, in 1988, the law changed again. More importantly, with one United 
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States Supreme Court opinion, the lines drawn by this study could change 
drastically. Such is the nature of the law and of free speech analysis. 
What does this mean for the academician? It indicates that all 
educators, professors and administrators alike, must make more of a 
concerted effort to keep abreast of the law surrounding professorial speech. 
By having an understanding of past developments and an interest in any new 
Supreme Court decisions, those in higher edu'cation will be better equipped to 
deal with what is (and will continue to be) a significant issue for colleges and 
universities nationwide. 
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